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INTRODUCTION
The documentary film Crude, directed by award-winning filmmaker
1
Joseph Berlinger, tells the story of a class action lawsuit brought by
thousands of Ecuadorians against the oil company Chevron, alleging
that the company’s systematic contamination of a portion of the Amazon jungle increased the rates of cancer, leukemia, birth defects, and
2
other health problems for the indigenous people of the region. Berlinger and his crew spent three years filming but captured only a small
3
portion of the ongoing fight between the Ecuadorians and Chevron.
By the time Berlinger’s cameras arrived, the legal battle was already a
dozen years old, and a title screen at the end of Crude predicts that the
4
litigation could last another decade. The film premiered at the 2009
5
Sundance Film Festival and went on to earn dozens of nominations
and awards from film festival juries and critics’ organizations around
6
the world.
In 2010, Chevron and, separately, two of Chevron’s lawyers who
7
were facing criminal charges in Ecuador for falsifying documents,

1

Berlinger is best known for two other legal documentaries, BROTHER’S KEEPER
(American Playhouse Theatrical Films 1992) and his trilogy of films about the “West
Memphis Three,” beginning with PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN
HOOD HILLS (HBO 1996), which brought national attention to, and contributed to the
release of, three men who had been imprisoned for eighteen years. Campbell Robertson, Rare Deal Frees 3 in ’93 Arkansas Child Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, at A1.
Berlinger has won, among other prizes, two Emmys, a Peabody, and the Audience
Award at the Sundance Film Festival, as well as awards from the Directors Guild of
America, the New York Film Critics Circle, the National Board of Review, and the Independent Spirit Awards. About Joe Berlinger, BERLINGER + SINOFSKY, http://
www.berlinger-sinofsky.com/#/berlinger/about (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
2
See CRUDE: THE REAL PRICE OF OIL (Third Eye Motion Picture Co. 2009); Synopsis, CRUDE: PRODUCTION NOTES (2009), available at http://crudethemovie.com/blog/
wp-content/uploads/2009/08/CRUDE-Press-Kit-081909.pdf (providing a brief overview
of the case against Chevron and the making of the film that documents it). Other
groups of Ecuadorians have brought different lawsuits alleging similar charges, including suits against the claimed polluter Texaco prior to its acquisition by its successor in
interest Chevron. See infra Part II.
3
Synopsis, CRUDE: PRODUCTION NOTES, supra note 2.
4
CRUDE, supra note 2; see also Historical Timeline of Events, CRUDE: PRODUCTION
NOTES, supra note 2 (noting that the first class action suit was filed in 1993 and that
principal photography for the film began in 2005).
5
About the Production, CRUDE: PRODUCTION NOTES, supra note 2.
6
For a list of Crude’s awards, nominations, and festival screenings, see Awards &
Festivals, CRUDE: A JOE BERLINGER FILM, http://www.crudethemovie.com/awards-andfestivals (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
7
Hereinafter I will refer to Chevron and the lawyers facing criminal charges collectively as “Chevron.”
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moved to subpoena nearly six-hundred hours of raw footage, or “out8
takes,” that Berlinger did not include in the completed film. Chevron
sought to prove that the plaintiffs’ lawyers exerted improper influence
over judges and experts involved in the proceedings in Ecuador
through ex parte communications, and it argued that Berlinger’s
9
footage contained evidence of this misconduct. Berlinger attempted
to quash the subpoenas on the ground that he was protected by the
10
journalists’ privilege.
The district court ordered Berlinger to turn over all of his out11
takes —the largest mandate to turn over outtakes ever ordered by a
12
U.S. court. In doing so, the court revealed its misunderstanding of
outtakes and how they should be treated under the existing journalists’ privilege doctrine. The Second Circuit’s standard for obtaining
nonconfidential material from journalists, set forth in Gonzales v. NBC,
requires petitioners to prove that the material sought is “of likely relevance to a significant issue in the case” and “not reasonably obtainable
13
from other available sources.” The district court in the Berlinger litigation, after assuming that this qualified privilege applies to independent documentary filmmakers, narrowed the protection of journalistic work product by collapsing the two-pronged Gonzales test into

8

In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). The motion was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, seeking discovery for use in
a proceeding in a foreign tribunal. 709 F. Supp. 2d at 289-90.
9
Id. at 295-96.
10
Id. at 285, 293. While the Second Circuit does recognize a qualified privilege
for journalists, it has repeatedly declined to explain whether this privilege is derived
from the First Amendment or from federal common law. See United States v. Treacy,
639 F.3d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that the court had “previously declined to resolve [the issue] absent any Congressional retrenchment of the privilege” and again
“declin[ing] to wade into these constitutional waters”).
11
In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
12
See Brief for ABC, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents-Appellants
at 1-2, Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-1918, 10-1966),
2010 WL 2648173, at *1-2 (“The District Court’s order granted an application by . . .
Chevron . . . to subpoena what appears to be the largest amount of film outtakes in
American history . . . .”); Norman Lear, Was Oil Named ‘Crude’ Because of the Way Oil
Companies Do Business?, HUFFINGTON POST ( June 8, 2010, 2:44 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/norman-lear/was-oil-named-crude-becau_b_604741.html (describing
the district court’s order as “the largest turnover of a reporter’s work product in American history”). Compare the six-hundred hours of Berlinger’s footage with the few
hours, at most, of interview footage ordered discoverable in United States v. LaRouche
Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1177 (1st Cir. 1988), and United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963,
966 (5th Cir. 1998), as well as the footage of the short traffic stop ordered discoverable
in Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999).
13
194 F.3d at 36.
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a general standard of “likely relevance” for outtakes, and lowered the
14
15
bar for what constitutes relevance. The Second Circuit narrowed
16
The Second Circuit further
but nonetheless affirmed the order.
ruled that because Berlinger appeared to be subject to the influence
of his filmmaking subjects, he lacked the editorial independence nec17
essary to qualify for the journalists’ privilege.
This Comment argues that the courts’ improper assumptions about
outtakes and documentary filmmaking led to an inappropriate weakening of the journalists’ privilege as applied to nonfiction filmmakers
and other noninstitutional media entities. While journalistic work
product should not be protected in all cases, the courts’ imprecise application of the relevant standard treats documentarians like secondclass journalists. This imprecision also endangers the future production of independent, investigative documentaries, which warrant protection for the same reasons that courts embrace a qualified privilege
for other kinds of journalism.
Part I traces the evolution of the journalists’ privilege in the Second Circuit. Part II discusses the opinions in the Berlinger litigation.
Part III argues that the Second Circuit’s new “independence” test will
result in courts discriminating against journalists not on account of
their output but because of their motivations and associations. Part IV
then considers several ways in which filmmakers might approach projects in this new legal landscape to better protect their footage and
their subjects. Such approaches include signing agreements with subjects, offering subjects final cut approval, destroying unreleased footage after the film has been released, and altering filming techniques.
Under the Second Circuit’s weakened protections, filmmakers will
not find any effective legal means of preventing discovery of their
footage, short of altering their filmmaking practices or destroying unused footage—methods that impose their own costs and may affect
the quantity and quality of documentaries that explore the justice system in action. The best way to meet the needs of the justice system
while minimizing the impact on the production of documentaries is to
apply the existing journalists’ privilege doctrine properly. Once
courts recognize and correct common misunderstandings about outtakes and video evidence, documentary filmmakers can be treated the

14
15
16
17

See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 295-98; see also infra Section II.A.
See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 308.
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same as other newsgatherers who serve the vital role of investigating
and disseminating valuable information to the public.
I. FROM BRANZBURG TO BERLINGER
Today, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have shield
laws that grant journalists either an absolute or qualified privilege
concerning confidential sources; roughly two-thirds of these laws also
18
protect journalists’ work product, such as outtakes. Twelve other
states recognize either a constitutional or a common law privilege for
19
reporters, at least in civil cases. Most federal courts recognize that
under a federal common law privilege, journalists need not disclose
20
confidential sources. But the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have rejected extending the privilege to nonconfidential journalistic work prod21
uct, and the Sixth Circuit rejects any type of federal journalists’ privi18

See Shield Laws and Protection of Sources by State, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/shieldmap.html (last visited Dec. 15,
2011); see also Anthony L. Fargo & Paul McAdoo, Common Law or Shield Law? How Rule
501 Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1347, 1355-57
(2007) (surveying state privilege statutes and noting that about two-thirds of the laws
protect journalists’ work product); RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact,
Perception, and Legal Protection in the Changing World of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 317, 384-85 & n.263 (2009) (listing state shield statutes). New York’s shield law,
typical of other states, provides for “[a]bsolute protection for confidential news” and
“qualified protection” for nonconfidential news. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)–(c)
(McKinney 2010). Those seeking nonconfidential information from journalists must
show that the news is (1) “highly material and relevant,” (2) “critical or necessary to
the maintenance of a party’s claim, defense or proof of an issue thereto material,” and
(3) “not obtainable from any alternative source.” Id. § 79-h(c). The act defines a professional journalist as “one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping or photographing of news intended
for . . . dissemination to the public” via a professional medium or agency. Id. § 79h(a)(6) (emphasis added).
19
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(Tatel, J., concurring) (stating that forty-nine states and the District of Columbia recognize some form of the journalists’ privilege).
20
See Fargo & McAdoo, supra note 18, at 1359-62 (summarizing federal privilege
law); Michael Fitzsimmons, Casenote, Defending the Informers: The Media’s Right to Protect
Non-Confidential Source Information Following United States v. Smith, 6 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 295, 305 n.55 (1999) (listing and categorizing circuit court decisions on the
journalists’ privilege).
21
See United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 969-71 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding “little
support in either the plurality or the concurring opinions of Branzburg” for a reporter’s
privilege to nonconfidential journalistic work product); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d
530, 532-34 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that when a journalist tries to protect nonconfidential information, the court should not focus on privilege and instead “should
simply make sure that a subpoena duces tecum directed to the media, like any other
subpoena duces tecum, is reasonable in the circumstances”).
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22

lege. In addition, the Department of Justice has adopted its own
guidelines limiting the circumstances in which prosecutors should
23
subpoena journalists, regardless of the jurisdiction or controlling law.
Any proper discussion of the journalists’ privilege, however, must
begin with the Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg.
A. Branzburg v. Hayes
In the landmark 1972 Supreme Court case Branzburg v. Hayes, the
Court declined to hold that reporters could avoid testifying before
24
state or federal grand juries by invoking the First Amendment.
25
However, Justice White, writing for four other Justices, noted that the
First Amendment might protect journalists who were the subject of
bad-faith investigations or harassment by government officials for rea26
sons unrelated to law enforcement.
Justice Powell, who joined Justice White’s opinion, wrote separate27
ly to “emphasize . . . the limited nature of the Court’s holding.” He
also noted that a reporter is entitled to a First Amendment remedy if

22

Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580,
583-86 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the “balancing of interests” that occurs in journalists’ privilege cases “should not then be elevated . . . to the status of a first amendment
constitutional privilege”).
23
The guidelines direct prosecutors, prior to seeking a subpoena in a criminal case
or a civil case of substantial importance, to take steps such as making reasonable attempts to obtain the information from other sources, entering into negotiations with
the media, and establishing through use of nonmedia sources reasonable grounds for
the belief that the information sought is essential. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2011).
24
408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972). The Court considered the consolidated appeals of
three journalists who witnessed criminal or potentially criminal activity and who were
asked by prosecutors to reveal sources or information that the reporters had agreed to
keep confidential. Id. at 667-79; see also David A. Anderson, Confidential Sources Reconsidered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 891-99 (2009) (arguing that the facts of Branzburg did not
present the case for constitutional protection in the best light and detailing the “meliorations” and “unraveling” of the decision over the years); Fitzsimmons, supra note 20,
at 300-05 (describing the Branzburg opinions in detail).
25
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665. Even though the Court’s opinion represented the
views of five Justices, some commentators refer to Branzburg as a “plurality” decision or
its equivalent due to Justice Powell’s enigmatic concurrence, which purported to endorse the majority but also espoused a case-by-case analysis. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla,
The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources: A Curious Study in “Reverse Federalism,” 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1423, 1424-28 (2008) (highlighting the ambiguities of the Powell
concurrence and how media advocates “exploited” them until courts began to “second
guess” the plurality reading of the case in the 1990s); Fitzsimmons, supra note 20, at
301 (stating outright that the opinion is a “plurality”).
26
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08.
27
Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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he is subject to the harassment of bad-faith investigations, or if the information he is asked to reveal bears “only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if . . . his testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of
28
law enforcement.” Powell insisted that courts should balance the
need for a free press against the general obligation to provide testi29
mony in criminal cases on a case-by-case basis.
Following Branzburg, many commentators and courts accepted the
argument that, by grouping Justice Powell with the four dissenting Justices who endorsed constitutional protections for journalists, a majority of the Justices had endorsed a limited journalists’ privilege ground30
ed in the First Amendment. As a result, in general, the scope of the
31
journalists’ privilege expanded after Branzburg. In McKevitt v. Pallasch,
Judge Posner criticized this reading and the court decisions that em32
braced it. He noted that Justice Powell concurred not only in the
judgment but also in Justice White’s opinion, which rendered it a le33
gitimate majority opinion. But as states adopted their own shield
laws for journalists and the Department of Justice issued its own subpoena guidelines, Branzburg gradually became less of an interpretive
34
problem for the courts.
B. Second Circuit Jurisprudence Following Branzburg
Following Branzburg, the Second Circuit expanded protection for
journalists, primarily to avoid the chilling effect that would follow if
prosecutors were able to use journalists as “an investigative arm of the
28

Id. at 710.
Id.
30
See Anderson, supra note 24, at 894 (discussing this grouping of opinions and
Judge Posner’s criticism of it in McKevitt v. Pallasch); Recent Case, Lee v. Department of
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1924 & n.6 (2006) (noting the grouping and listing
cases advancing this argument).
31
See Recent Case, Lee v. Department of Justice, supra note 30, at 1923-24 (“In the
years following [Branzburg] most circuits . . . creat[ed] heightened newsgathering protections for the press by construing Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg as allowing
qualified journalist privileges.”).
32
339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (criticizing other cases that either “essentially
ignore Branzburg” or “audaciously declare that Branzburg actually created a reporter’s
privilege”).
33
See id. at 531-32.
34
See Anderson, supra note 24, at 892-93 (noting that a “major showdown over
confidential sources” was averted due to, among other things, the Department of Justice’s adoption of subpoena guidelines and the increasing number of states adopting
shield laws).
29
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35

government.” The Second Circuit’s first major post-Branzburg case
concerned Alfred Balk, a journalist and journalism professor who refused to identify a source for a Saturday Evening Post article he wrote
36
about racially discriminatory real estate practices in Chicago. The
civil rights class action plaintiffs sought the identity of Balk’s source as
37
evidence of discriminatory practices known as “blockbusting.” Balk,
who had promised his source anonymity, argued that the First
Amendment granted him a privilege against testifying, and the district
court, deciding the case prior to Branzburg, ruled that Balk could not be
38
compelled to reveal the identity of his source. Judge Bonsal of the
Southern District of New York concluded that the plaintiffs had shown
neither “that all other available sources [had] been exhausted” nor that
39
disclosure was “essential to the protection of the public interest.”
The Second Circuit, ruling after Branzburg, affirmed the district
court’s decision in holding that the First Amendment protects journalists from revealing confidential sources if “the public interest in
non-disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources outweighs the
40
public and private interest in compelled testimony.” The court concluded that no “compelling concern” here outweighed the First
41
Amendment interest in maintaining confidentiality. In its discussion
of this interest, the court stated that “[c]ompelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a journalist’s ability to secure
information that is made available to him only on a confidential basis”
and that the deterrent effect of a contrary ruling would “threaten[]
freedom of the press and the public’s need to be informed,” particu42
larly in the context of investigative reporting. The Second Circuit
easily distinguished Branzburg as being limited to the disclosure of

35

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
36
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972).
37
Id. Blockbusting is an umbrella term for a number of practices designed to manipulate real estate prices in order to affect the racial, ethnic, or religious composition
of a neighborhood. See Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 214
(N.D. Ill. 1969) (defining “blockbusting” as “stimulat[ing] and prey[ing] on racial bigotry and fear by initiating and encouraging rumors that negroes were about to move
into a given area, that all non-negroes would leave, and that the market values of properties would descend to ‘panic prices’”).
38
Baker v. F & F Inv., 339 F. Supp. 942, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
39
Id.
40
Baker, 470 F.2d at 783.
41
Id. at 785.
42
Id. at 782.
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confidential sources before grand juries investigating criminal activity,
43
and declined to apply it in a civil case.
In von Bulow v. von Bulow, the Second Circuit continued to expand the privilege by broadening the class of individuals who could
invoke its protection and stating explicitly that the privilege extended
44
to nonconfidential information. In von Bulow, Andrea Reynolds, a
friend of Martha von Bulow, attempted to invoke the journalists’ privilege to prevent disclosure of an unpublished manuscript of a book she
was writing about the civil litigation between Martha and Claus von
45
Bulow. The Second Circuit concluded that anyone, regardless of
whether she was a member of the “institutionalized press,” could invoke the journalists’ privilege as long as she, “at the inception of the
newsgathering process,” intended to disseminate to the public the in46
formation obtained from her sources. The court stated that prior
experience as a journalist was not required; rather, the inquiry should
focus on whether Reynolds was “involved in activities traditionally as47
sociated with the gathering and dissemination of news.” Nor did the
court limit the privilege to those working in a particular medium, such
as newspapers or magazines, because “[t]he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle
48
of information and opinion.” By focusing exclusively on whether the
information gatherer’s intent was to disseminate her work to the public, the Second Circuit expressly stated for the first time that the privi49
lege protected both confidential and nonconfidential information.

43

See id. at 784 (“Branzburg . . . is only of tangential relevance to this case.”).
See 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he relationship between the journalist
and his source may be confidential or nonconfidential for the purposes of the privilege.”).
45
Id. at 138. The civil dispute between the von Bulows alleged that Claus put Martha into a permanent comatose state “by injecting her surreptitiously with insulin and
other drugs.” Id. at 139.
46
Id. at 142, 144.
47
Id. at 142.
48
Id. at 144 (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)). The federal privacy law, designed to protect First Amendment activities, forbids government
actors from searching or seizing journalistic work product and, like von Bulow, defines
the privilege broadly. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2006). The statute covers “any work
product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public
communication.” Id.
49
811 F.2d at 142. The court noted that other federal courts had reached the same
conclusion and quoted the Middle District of Florida for the proposition that with regard to materials developed by a reporter in preparation for an article, the “nonconfidentiality of [a] source was utterly irrelevant to [the] chilling effect on [the] flow of
44
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The court nonetheless declined to extend the privilege to Reynolds on the ground that she did not have the requisite intent to disseminate the information to the public when she undertook her book
50
project. The court found that other impulses had motivated Reynolds to gather information about the von Bulows, including her desire
to bolster the credibility of the von Bulow children in support of the
underlying litigation as well as her desire to secure her own peace of
51
mind. The court noted that only on “rare occasions” had “persons
who are not journalists in the traditional sense of that term” success52
fully invoked the journalists’ privilege. But the court’s permissive
test was a signal that “lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic
researchers, and dramatists,” among others, deserved the same pro53
tection as a veteran reporter for the New York Times. The ruling affirmed the importance of nontraditional journalists gathering information for the public’s benefit.
In United States v. Cutler, the Second Circuit, confronting a criminal defendant seeking outtakes from a television interview, set a high
54
standard for compelling disclosure. The case involved a subpoena
for outtakes of a television interview with an attorney facing criminal
contempt charges, which the reporters and television station sought to
55
quash. The court recited the “well settled” proposition that in order
“to protect the important interests of reporters and the public in preserving the confidentiality of journalists’ sources,” disclosure of journalistic work product may be compelled in civil cases “only upon a
information to press and public.” Id. at 143 (quoting Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp.
1299, 1300, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50
See id. at 145-46 (“[O]ur central inquiry as to whether Reynolds is entitled to
claim a journalist’s privilege must be answered in the negative.”).
51
Id. at 139.
52
Id. at 143. For example, in 1977, the Tenth Circuit confronted the case of Arthur Hirsch, a freelance reporter and film student who, as a nonparty witness, tried to
invoke the journalists’ privilege to avoid revealing confidential sources. Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 434 (10th Cir. 1977). The court held that Hirsch—
who had formed a production company with a UCLA professor and a fellow film student in order to make a documentary film about the death of Karen Silkwood—could
invoke the privilege to protect research he had done in anticipation of making the
film. Id. at 435-37. The court reasoned that Hirsch spent “considerable time and effort in obtaining facts . . . in preparation of [making] the film. It strikes us as somewhat anomalous that the appellee would argue that he is not a genuine reporter entitled to the privilege.” Id. at 436-37.
53
Von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144-45 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705
(1972)).
54
6 F.3d 67, 68, 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1993).
55
Id. at 69-70.
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clear and specific showing that the information is: highly material and
relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not
56
obtainable from other available sources.” The court ordered the television station to turn over the outtakes on the ground that the footage
was “clearly relevant,” necessary to defend against a criminal charge
and, other than the attorney’s own testimony, “probably the only sig57
nificant proof regarding his assertedly criminal behavior.”
The years following Cutler represented the high-water mark of the
58
journalists’ privilege in civil cases in the Second Circuit. Although
the Second Circuit had not expressly ruled that journalists—as defined under the expansive von Bulow formulation—were entitled to a
strong privilege for confidential information and a qualified privilege
for nonconfidential information, district courts in the Second Circuit
59
assumed as much throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, beginning in 1999 with Gonzales v. NBC, the Second Circuit started to con60
tract the privilege in civil cases.
The Gonzales case centered on hidden camera footage recorded by
Dateline NBC, a news magazine show, for a program about law enforcement abuses, namely unwarranted traffic stops of out-of-state or
61
minority drivers in Louisiana. An undercover NBC reporter rigged a
car with hidden cameras, set his car on cruise control below the speed
62
limit, and obeyed all traffic laws. The reporter was stopped by Louisiana Deputy Sheriff Darrell Pierce, and some footage of the stop was
63
aired on NBC. In a separate incident, Plaintiffs Albert and Mary
Gonzales were stopped by Deputy Pierce and, after filing a civil rights
action against Deputy Pierce for stopping them on the basis of their

56

Id. at 71 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77
(2d Cir. 1983)).
57
Id. at 73.
58
The Second Circuit later observed that Cutler itself was a retreat from the highwater mark of United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), which had “set too high
a bar for overcoming the privilege in criminal cases.” United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d
32, 43 (2d Cir. 2011). In Treacy, the Second Circuit held that “the showing required to
overcome the journalist’s privilege [for nonconfidential information] is the same in a
criminal case as it is in a civil case—namely, the showing required by Gonzales.” Id.
59
See Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 34 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing fourteen district
court opinions that assumed and enforced the privilege for nonconfidential material).
60
194 F.3d 29.
61
Id. at 31.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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Hispanic origin, sought access to NBC’s outtakes of the Deputy Pierce
64
traffic stop filmed for Dateline.
Reviewing the district court’s motion to compel disclosure, the
Second Circuit explicitly held that in a civil case nonconfidential in65
formation is protected by a qualified privilege. In isolation, such a
holding would have strengthened the journalists’ privilege in the Second Circuit. But the court further ruled that the privilege could be
overcome upon a lesser showing than would be necessary to obtain
66
confidential information. This holding was curious. The court described at length the “broader concerns” implicated by the journalists’
privilege, including the “pivotal function of reporters to collect infor67
mation for public dissemination” and the “paramount public interest
in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press
capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controver68
sial matters.”
The court concluded that these concerns “are relevant regardless
69
whether the information sought from the press is confidential.” It
posited that widespread exposure of press files would burden the
press, increase costs for the media, deter sources from speaking to the
press or increase their insistence on confidentiality, encourage journalists to dispose of files containing potentially valuable information,
and lend to the press the appearance of being an investigative arm of
70
the judicial system. Yet the court then proceeded to require a lesser
71
showing in order to gain access to nonconfidential information. The
64

Id. at 30-31.
See id. at 30 (reaffirming the existence of a “qualified privilege for nonconfidential press information”).
66
Id. The case came to the Second Circuit on an unusual posture. Originally, the
district court held that a qualified privilege existed for nonconfidential information,
but the requirements for overcoming the privilege had not been met. Id. The Second
Circuit affirmed on the ground that no qualified privilege existed for nonconfidential
information. Id. But after a motion for a rehearing by NBC, the Second Circuit “reconsidered [its] opinion” and explicitly reaffirmed the existence of a qualified privilege for nonconfidential information. Id.
67
Id. at 35 (quoting In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.
1982)).
68
Id. at 35 (quoting Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972)).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 35-36. For an in-depth discussion of Gonzales and, in particular, the curiosity of requiring a lesser showing for nonconfidential information, see generally Anthony
L. Fargo, Reconsidering the Federal Journalist’s Privilege for Non-Confidential Information:
Gonzales v. NBC, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 355 (2001). Fargo points out that the
Third and Ninth Circuits also agree “in principle” with the Second Circuit that the
65

ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

The Future of the Journalists’ Privilege

2/15/2012 7:08 PM

877

court merely stated that “where the protection of confidential sources
is not involved, the nature of the press interest protected by the privi72
lege is narrower.” For nonconfidential information, a civil litigant is
entitled to discovery upon a showing that the materials are “of likely
relevance to a significant issue in the case” and “not reasonably ob73
tainable from other available sources.” The court focused on the
circumstances surrounding the conveyance of information, rather
than the effect disclosure would have on the press, and concluded
that if information was not communicated in confidence, journalists
74
should not be able to shield it from court proceedings so easily.
Applying its newly minted test to the facts, the court held that the
75
Gonzaleses were entitled to the outtakes. The footage was “clearly
relevant to a significant issue in the case”: whether Deputy Pierce en76
gaged in a pattern of stopping vehicles without probable cause. The
court also found that the information contained in the outtakes was
not available from other sources “because they can provide unim77
peachably objective evidence of Deputy Pierce’s conduct.” A deposition, the court noted, would not be an adequate substitute for the in78
formation that could be obtained from the videotapes.
The Gonzales court got a couple of things right and one thing
wrong about outtakes. First, it recognized that the information contained within the outtakes was conceptually separate from the physical
videotapes possessed by NBC. The court spoke of “the evidence in the
tapes” and the fact that “the outtakes contain information that is not
79
reasonably obtainable from other available sources.” Second, in deciding whether the information contained within the outtakes was
available from other sources, the court considered at least one other
80
source that might be available. It did not, however, discuss what other
efforts the Gonzaleses made, or could have made, to find evidence of

privilege for nonconfidential information is weaker than that for confidential material.
Id. at 387.
72
Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 32, 36 (emphasis added). For a discussion of how this distinction was
blurred in the district court’s opinion in the Berlinger case, see infra Section III.D.
80
See Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36 (considering the adequacy of a deposition as another
available source for the information).
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Deputy Pierce’s conduct. The court ultimately rejected the adequacy
81
of a deposition as a substitute for the outtakes.
But the court revealed its misunderstanding of video and other
photographic evidence by describing outtakes as providing “unim82
peachably objective evidence.” Section III.D of this Comment discusses in detail the fallacy of treating video footage as unquestionably
objective evidence, but it is sufficient to note at this juncture that a
wealth of film scholars, legal commentators, and documentary
filmmakers reject the notion that video and photographs have objec83
tive meaning independent of context. This suggests that visual evidence should be treated as substantive evidence, rather than as a special class of demonstrative proof. This seemingly small misstep laid
the groundwork for further mistakes by the Berlinger court.
II. CHEVRON CORP. V. BERLINGER
In 1964, Texaco began drilling for oil in the Amazon rainforest of
84
eastern Ecuador. There, the company built and operated oil fields
85
and a trans-Ecuadorian pipeline for more than a quarter century. In
1976, the government of Ecuador, through its state-owned oil company,
Petroecuador, became the majority stakeholder in the oil consortium
that had been formed to conduct the oil operations in the country
86
and that was owned in part and operated by Texaco. Petroecuador
81

Id.
Id.
83
See Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257,
1297 (2010) [hereinafter Silbey, Evidence Verité] (“Photographs . . . should be admitted as substantive evidence . . . and analyzed for their assertive message, rather than
considered demonstrative aids or real evidence.”); Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 496-99, 519-20
(2004) [hereinafter Silbey, Judges as Film Critics] (criticizing the judicial approach to
filmic evidence that treats film as if it were an “unimpeachable eyewitness,” and arguing that judges miscategorize film as demonstrative evidence, rather than substantive
and assertive in nature); Alison Lynn Tuley, Note, Outtakes, Hidden Cameras, and the
First Amendment: A Reporter’s Privilege, 38 WM & MARY L. REV. 1817, 1832 (1997) (arguing that judges view video evidence as a category of its own, making it more likely that
outtakes will be treated differently than other journalistic work product); see also Errol
Morris, Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG ( July 10, 2007, 2:14 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/pictures-are-supposed-to-be-worth-athousand-words (criticizing the common belief that photographs reveal “an objective
piece of reality” and arguing that photographs only contain truth in context “with respect to statements we make about them or the questions we might ask of them”).
84
In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d. 283, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
85
Id.
86
Id.
82
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assumed operational control in 1990 and purchased all of Texaco’s
87
Ecuadorean assets in 1992. The next year, 30,000 Ecuadoreans filed
a federal class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York
against Texaco, alleging that the company had dumped billions of gallons of oil and inadequately treated toxic waste into the Amazon basin, destroying its natural habitats and biodiversity and harming the
88
indigenous community. One of the tribes most affected by the oil
production was the Cofán nation. By 2006, of the 15,000 tribe members who once lived on their ancestral land between the Pisurie and
Aguarico Rivers, only a few hundred remained, many suffering from
cancer, birth defects, or other diseases stemming from, at least in part,
89
a lack of clean drinking water. The case was dismissed in 2001 on
90
grounds of forum non conveniens. Chevron inherited Texaco’s liabilities when it merged with Texaco in 2001, and, in 2003, a new
group of Ecuadorians, including some of the plaintiffs from the previous action, brought suit under Ecuadorian law against Chevron in
91
Lago Agrio, Ecuador. Throughout the litigation, Chevron contended that there was no evidence of an increase in cancer rate, no evidence that cancer was linked to the oil production, and no evidence
that any environmental harm was caused by Texaco, as opposed to
92
Petroecuador.
Steven Donziger, an American attorney and one of the lead counsel for the plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio litigation, sought to raise
awareness of the case and put public and media pressure on Chevron
by inviting journalists, filmmakers, and celebrity activists to report on
93
or publicize the environmental devastation in Ecuador.
In 2005,
87

Press Release, Chevron Corp., Ecuador Lawsuit Report Has Fabricated Evidence,
Tainted by Political Pressure (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://investor.chevron.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1197255.
88
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93-7527, 1994 WL 142006, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,
1994).
89
See CRUDE, supra note 2; see also Juan Forero, ‘Gringo Chief’ Helps Craft an Indian
Community’s Success Story, WASH. POST, June 21, 2010, at A10 (estimating the current
population of the tribe in Ecuador at 1200); Programa Selva Amazonica Ecuatoriana, SELVA VIDA SIN FRONTERAS, http://www.selvavidasinfronteras.org/contenidos.php?menu=
39&idiom=2 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (estimating the current population at 700, down
from 15,000 in the 1960s).
90
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
91
See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (discussing the procedural history of the
Lago Agrio litigation); see also CRUDE, supra note 2.
92
CRUDE, supra note 2.
93
See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (noting that Donziger approached Berlinger to make a film about the litigation); see also CRUDE, supra note 2 (depicting
Donziger’s efforts to pitch an article to Vanity Fair, orchestrate press conferences in the
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Donziger met Berlinger, who eventually agreed to embark on a longterm documentary project about the litigation and the underlying
94
Berlinger and his crew shot more than sixecological disaster.
95
hundred hours of footage over the next three years, during which
96
they enjoyed “extraordinary access” to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. The final version of Crude focuses on the evidentiary phase of the trial and
includes: interviews with Ecuadoreans affected by the oil production,
scenes of plaintiffs’ lawyers strategizing about the litigation, interviews
with Chevron lawyers and spokespeople, scenes of judicial inspections
of the oil pits created by Texaco, and footage of an independent
court-appointed expert as he prepared a nonbinding global damage
97
assessment to quantify the damage attributable to Texaco. The film
concludes with the expert completing his report for the judge, in
98
which he finds Texaco responsible for up to $27 billion in damages.
A. The District Court Orders Discovery
Chevron filed an application for subpoenas in the Southern District of New York, seeking the outtakes of Crude to provide evidence of
misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs’ lawyers during the underlying
99
Lago Agrio litigation. Chevron argued that the footage was “highly
100
likely to be directly relevant” to the Lago Agrio litigation. Berlinger
argued in response that his footage was protected by the journalists’
101
privilege. Judge Kaplan, writing for the court, first determined that
under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 the district court had the authority to issue an
order to compel discovery of the evidence for use in a foreign pro-

United States, and introduce Trudie Styler, environmental activist and wife of the musician Sting, to the people of Ecuador).
94
See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (describing the meeting as Donziger
“solicit[ing]” Berlinger “to tell his clients’ story”). The court’s description of the meeting as a solicitation is potentially misleading, however, because it suggests that
Donziger financed, or offered to finance, the documentary, which he did not. See infra
notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
95
See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
96
Synopsis, CRUDE: PRODUCTION NOTES, supra note 2.
97
See CRUDE, supra note 2.
98
See id.
99
In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 289-90.
100
Id. at 290.
101
Id. at 293.
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102

ceeding. The court then turned to whether the journalists’ privilege
103
prevented the application of § 1782 in this case.
First, the court noted that the Second Circuit had not addressed
the issue of whether the journalists’ privilege extended to documen104
tary filmmakers. The court did note, however, that under von Bulow
an individual “involved in activities traditionally associated with the
gathering and dissemination of news” may still assert the qualified
105
privilege even if he is not a “member of the institutionalized press.”
Applying the von Bulow test, the court assumed that because Berlinger
gathered information about a “newsworthy event” and “disseminated
his film to the public,” the qualified privilege applied to Berlinger’s
106
outtakes.
The court then had to categorize the outtakes as confidential or
nonconfidential to determine which of the two tests applied: the
107
higher Cutler standard or the lower Gonzales standard. Berlinger argued that the outtakes were confidential because he had “entered into
agreements” with some sources that he would not use “certain footage” of them “without first obtaining their express authorization,” and
because he had developed relationships of trust with other sources,
who had an explicit or implicit understanding that the footage not
108
However,
used in the final product “would remain confidential.”
the court was not persuaded. In rejecting Berlinger’s arguments, it
faulted the filmmaker for failing to identify which individual subjects
or which, if any, outtakes were covered by alleged confidentiality
agreements, since footage that was not subject to such agreements
109
could not possibly be considered confidential.
Key to the court’s analysis was the finding that Berlinger’s subjects
could not have had any expectation of confidentiality in any particular
footage because the standard release form signed by subjects granted
102

Id. at 290-93. The court first determined that Chevron’s request met the statutory requirements of § 1782. Id. at 291; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006). The court
then looked to the discretionary factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 29193. The court concluded that “petitioners have satisfied the Intel discretionary factors.”
Id. at 293.
103
In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
104
Id. at 294.
105
Id. (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987)).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. (emphasis omitted).
109
Id. at 294-95.
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the filmmaker “carte blanche” to use any of the footage in the released
110
film. The court reasoned that subjects appeared on camera for the
purpose of having their images and words disseminated “in whatever
111
Because “Berlinger alone refilm Berlinger decided to create.”
tained control of the content of the film,” the court determined that
the film’s subjects could not have had a reasonable expectation of
112
confidentiality. Because the court found the outtakes to be noncon113
fidential, they were subject to the less stringent Gonzales test. But the
court left the door cracked open for future filmmakers by noting that,
although Berlinger did not present persuasive evidence of confidentiality agreements, the court would have considered affidavits or other
114
evidence to determine whether the filmmaker had met his burden.
To assess the “likely relevance” prong of the Gonzales test, the
court considered three scenes from Crude that Chevron argued were
“concrete evidence” that the outtakes contained “more than likely rel115
evant” footage of other improper conduct by the plaintiffs’ lawyers.
First, the court considered a scene in which plaintiffs’ counsel allegedly participated in a “supposedly neutral” focus group conducted by an
expert contributing to the global damages assessment report—a scene
which was removed from the DVD version of the film at the request of
the plaintiffs’ lawyers after Berlinger showed the film to lawyers repre116
senting both sides. The court stated that this conduct was “suggestive
of an awareness of questionable activity” and supportive of Chevron’s
argument that other “outtakes are relevant to significant issues in the
117
A second scene showed plaintiffs’ counsel
Lago Agrio Litigation.”
110

Id.
Id. at 295.
112
Id.
113
Id. (citing Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999)).
114
Id. at 295 n.69. For one example of a filmmaker-subject relationship that likely
would qualify as confidential, see EXIT THROUGH THE GIFT SHOP (Paranoid Pictures
Film Co. Ltd. 2010), which depicts the street artist Banksy without showing his face and
having digitally altered his voice. The filmmaker’s raw footage, which might include
shots of Banksy’s face and unaltered voice, would likely qualify for confidential protection under the district court’s test.
115
In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 295-96.
116
Id. at 296; see also Declaration of Joseph A. Berlinger ¶ 33, In re Chevron, 709 F.
Supp. 2d 293 (No. 19-0111), available at http://www.crudethemovie.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2009/08/Berlinger-I1.pdf (describing how Berlinger gave both sides
an opportunity to review the film for accuracy before the theatrical release).
117
709 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97. Berlinger contends that the footage did not depict
one of the neutral focus groups and that he edited the scene for narrative clarity, rather than any attempt to conceal behavior by the plaintiffs’ counsel. Declaration of
Joseph A. Berlinger supra note 116, ¶ 32 (“The reason I edited Dr. Beristain from the
111
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requesting that a judge block an order to investigate a laboratory used
118
by the plaintiffs to test soil and water samples. A third scene depicted ex parte interactions between plaintiffs’ lawyers and government
officials, and Chevron argued the outtakes likely depicted other at119
tempts to “curry favor” with the Government of Ecuador. Berlinger
responded by claiming that Chevron’s assumptions about the outtakes
were “entirely speculative” and that Chevron failed to particularize a
120
specific portion of the footage it believed was relevant.
The court disagreed with Berlinger, deciding that the outtakes
121
were likely relevant. For example, “[a]ny interaction between plaintiffs’ counsel and a supposedly neutral expert in the Lago Agrio Litigation” would be relevant to proving or disproving the expert’s inde122
pendence and reliability. The court explained that the inclusion of
excerpts of these interactions in the film “amply supports an inference
that the outtakes contain additional relevant material,” and noted that
the “extraordinary access” granted to Berlinger supported the assumption that Berlinger’s outtakes were relevant to showing whether
the plaintiffs’ lawyers improperly influenced witnesses and govern123
Finally, the court completely rejected Berlinger’s
ment officials.
particularity argument: “[T]here is no uncertainty as to the type of
evidence petitioners seek. . . . [Chevron] cannot reasonably be expected to identify with particularity the outtakes that they seek where
124
knowledge of their content lies exclusively with Berlinger.”
Turning to the second prong of the Gonzales test, the court framed
the issue as “whether there is sufficient ground to believe that the foot125
age petitioners seek would not reasonably be obtainable elsewhere.”
Berlinger argued first that the footage was “cumulative or duplicative
Cofan meeting scene was not to ‘conceal’ any improper conduct by plaintiffs’ counsel,
but to prevent the scene from being misconstrued and taken out of context, just as
Chevron is attempting to do here.”).
118
709 F. Supp. 2d at 296. However, prior to this scene in the film, Donziger explains that it was improper for Chevron to seek the order in the first place. CRUDE,
supra note 2. Chevron’s lawyer and other news media were present during the discussion with the judge. Id.
119
709 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
120
Id. at 296-97.
121
Id. at 297-98.
122
Id. at 297.
123
Id. The court did not explain what relevance mere access to the film’s subjects
and the plaintiffs’ lawyers had to proving that the outtakes would be relevant to the
litigation.
124
Id. at 297.
125
Id. at 298.
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of the decades-worth of scientific reports and analyses performed by
126
Chevron”—an argument the court summarily rejected.
Berlinger
next argued that Chevron had failed to meet its burden to exhaust
other potential sources for the evidence, noting that Chevron often had
127
its own videographers present when Berlinger was filming. Without
addressing whether Chevron’s own footage should narrow the scope
of the subpoena, the court recited the Gonzales language that outtakes
128
were “‘unimpeachably objective’ evidence of any misconduct.”
Moreover, because Berlinger was “in sole possession of the Crude out129
The court
takes,” they could not be obtained from other sources.
also noted that depositions were not adequate substitutes for outtake
130
evidence and ordered Berlinger to turn over all of his outtakes.
By grounding its analysis in the characterization of Berlinger’s raw
131
footage as “‘unimpeachably objective’ evidence,” the court effectively
132
awarded special evidentiary status to outtakes.
By the court’s logic,
outtakes need only be sufficiently relevant to the underlying claims in
order to pass the second prong of the Gonzales test, rendering moot
the availability of the information from other sources. Thus, the district court’s opinion seems to collapse the two-pronged Gonzales test
into a single inquiry: whether the outtakes are likely relevant, a standard that the district court and, ultimately, the Second Circuit both
weakened. Although purportedly extending the Gonzales standard to
documentary filmmakers, the district court actually diluted the test
and pegged documentary filmmakers as second-class journalists, subject to different standards because their footage is classified as unimpeachably objective.
B. The Second Circuit Affirms
Immediately after hearing oral arguments in July 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed but narrowed the district court’s order by specifying that Berlinger only needed to turn over footage depicting certain individuals. The Second Circuit’s order compelled Berlinger to
126

Id.
Id.
128
Id. (quoting Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999)).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 298-99.
131
Id. at 298 (quoting Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36).
132
See Tuley, supra note 83, at 1832 (arguing that “judges implicitly consider video
evidence to be in a category all its own,” making it “more likely that outtakes will receive different treatment”).
127
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turn over “all footage that does not appear in publicly released versions of Crude showing: (a) counsel for the plaintiffs in the case of
Maria Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp.; (b) private or court-appointed
experts in that proceeding; or (c) current or former officials of the
133
Government of Ecuador.” The Second Circuit mandated that Chevron use the footage “solely for litigation, arbitration or submission to
official bodies” and that Chevron reimburse Berlinger’s “reasonable
134
expenses” of sorting and duplicating the footage.
Six months after oral argument, the Second Circuit issued its full
135
opinion “affirm[ing] in full the district court’s ruling.” Without disturbing any of the district court’s reasoning, Judge Leval, who also au136
thored the Second Circuit’s opinion in Gonzales, shifted the court’s
137
focus from confidentiality to Berlinger’s status as a journalist.
The
court concluded that Berlinger, due to his close relationship with the
plaintiffs’ lawyers, failed to prove that he undertook the documentary
project “with independence,” and thus he was only entitled to a weak
138
journalists’ privilege, if any privilege at all. The court explained that
under Second Circuit precedent, the purpose of the journalists’ privilege is primarily to “protect[] . . . the public’s interest in being in-

133

Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, Nos. 10-1918, 10-1966 (2d Cir. July 15, 2010) (order).
Id. Berlinger complied with the subpoena, and in later legal proceedings Chevron quickly convinced the court to issue additional subpoenas based on “extraordinarily
revealing” outtakes, compelling Donziger to submit to depositions conducted by Chevron lawyers. In re Application of Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); see also Barbara Leonard, Lawyer Must Comply with Chevron Subpoena, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 21, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/
2010/10/21/31264.htm. In subsequent proceedings, the court noted that the outtakes contained “substantial evidence” that Donziger and others had ex parte contacts
with the Ecuadorian court to obtain appointment of the “supposedly neutral and impartial” expert responsible for preparing the damages report, “secretly” worked with
the expert prior to his appointment, and “wrote some or all of the expert’s final report” submitted to the court. In re Application of Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d at 13839. The outtakes showed Donziger stating that the Ecuadorian court was corrupt and
the plaintiffs could “prevail only by pressuring and intimidating the courts.” In re Application of Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). For more discussion of the content of the outtakes and the subsequent legal proceedings, see Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YO`RKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 38, 45-49.
135
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2011).
136
Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1999).
137
See Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 300 (concluding that “Berlinger failed to carry his burden of showing that he collected information for the purpose of independent reporting
and commentary”).
138
Id. at 309-10. The court declined to answer the question of “whether the consequence of the failure of the claimant of the privilege to establish independence
means it has a weaker privilege or no privilege at all.” Id. at 309.
134
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formed by ‘a vigorous, aggressive and independent press.’”
Thus, to
qualify for the privilege, “the person must have acted in the role . . .
identified in Baker, von Bulow, and Gonzales as that favored by the public interest that motivates the privilege—the role of the independent
140
Further emphasizing the importance of independence, the
press.”
court stated:
Those who do not retain independence as to what they will publish but
are subservient to the objectives of others who have a stake in what will be
published have either a weaker privilege or none at all. . . . An undertaking to publish matter in order to promote the interests of another, regardless of justification, does not serve the same public interest, regard141
less of whether the resultant work may prove to be one of high quality.

Because Berlinger was “solicited” by Donziger to make the film, and
because Berlinger removed one scene from the final version of the
film at the request of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court reasonably denied Berlinger’s claim of
142
privilege.
Dismissing Berlinger’s argument that Chevron failed to prove the
relevance of the outtakes it sought, the Second Circuit concluded that
the Gonzales test does not apply to journalists who do not demonstrate
143
independence.
The Second Circuit then concisely rejected Berlinger’s claim of confidentiality. In light of the expansive release
signed by Berlinger’s subjects and without any significant evidence offered to the contrary, the district court was entitled to conclude that
144
Berlinger had not met his burden as to confidentiality. The Second
Circuit likewise made short work of Berlinger’s argument that the dis145
The court reasoned that the district court’s order was overbroad.
trict court had “greater discretion to order production of privileged
material” based on the finding that Berlinger lacked independence,
and it also faulted Berlinger for not providing the district court “with
any proposal for distinguishing between relevant and assertedly non146
relevant material.” The district court, according to the Second Cir-

139

Id. at 307 (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 307. The individual seeking the privilege has the burden of proving independence. Id. at 309.
141
Id. at 308.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 309.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 310.
146
Id.
140
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cuit, “is not obligated to undertake this burden without help from the
147
party requesting the limitation.”
III. ON INDEPENDENCE AND OUTTAKES
The Second Circuit failed to take advantage of the opportunity to
correct the district court’s errors, and, by focusing on Berlinger’s lack
of “independence,” misunderstood the nature of journalism and documentary film production. The introduction of the independence requirement and its application to Berlinger were misguided and may potentially bar the use of the journalists’ privilege by those outside the
institutional media, particularly documentary filmmakers. Even for
filmmakers who can meet the independence standard, the Second
Circuit weakened the Gonzales test’s relevancy requirement and effectively eliminated the important inquiry into alternative sources for obtaining the information. Finally, the courts overstated the objectivity
of outtakes, which will likely result in their underprotection, branding
filmmakers as a disfavored and disadvantaged class of journalists.
A. Factual Confusion About Independence,
Journalism, and Filmmaking
The first problem with the Second Circuit’s opinion was that it invented an independence requirement for the journalists’ privilege
that was not relied upon in the district court’s opinion or found in
other cases. “Although the [district] court did not explicitly state a
finding that Berlinger failed to show his independence,” the Second
Circuit wrote, its findings that Donziger both asked Berlinger to make
the film and successfully requested that a scene be removed from the
148
One reason, perDVD version “essentially assert that conclusion.”
haps, that the district court did not explicitly comment on Berlinger’s
independence was that such a requirement had never before been
part of the Second Circuit’s analysis. Moreover, the district court explicitly found Berlinger to be independent. The district court’s entire
analysis in rejecting Berlinger’s confidentiality claim was premised on
the findings that “Berlinger alone retained control of the content of
149
the film and determined what footage would be made public” and
that his subjects signed release forms granting Berlinger “carte blanche”
147

Id.
Id. at 308.
149
In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(emphasis added).
148
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150

to include or exclude footage as he saw fit. Had the district court actually concluded that Berlinger lacked editorial independence, as the
Second Circuit suggested, the court would have needed other justifications to prove Berlinger’s sources did not have an expectation of
151
confidentiality.
Furthermore, while the district court mentioned Donziger’s role
in initiating the documentary project, it did not find that Donziger or
others exerted enough editorial influence over Berlinger to negate
Berlinger’s independence. Rather, the district court emphasized
Donziger’s role only to support the inference that the outtakes likely
contained relevant evidence of improper conduct by the plaintiffs’
152
lawyers. The court mentioned the scene deleted from the final version only to support the conclusion “that the outtakes are relevant to
153
significant issues in the Lago Agrio Litigation.” If one scene in the
outtakes was known to be relevant, the court reasoned, then others
likely were too. But the district court never ruled that that Donziger
compelled Berlinger to excise the deleted scene. The Second Circuit—without citing reliable evidence that Berlinger in fact lacked independence—could not plausibly adopt the district court’s opinion
“in full” and still reach the conclusion it did.
The Second Circuit’s ruling implicitly set too high a bar for noninstitutional media to prove editorial and financial independence. By
repeatedly stating that the film had been “commissioned” or “solicit154
ed,” the court glossed over the fact that Donziger did not hire Ber155
linger to make the film, nor did he fund the project. As Crude documented, Donziger was eager to gain publicity for his case, and he
150

Id. at 294-95.
For a discussion of what the court might have accepted to prove confidentiality,
see infra Sections IV.A-B.
152
709 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
153
Id.
154
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 300, 302, 304-05, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2011).
155
In a filmmaking magazine cited by the district court, Berlinger recounted that
in his initial meeting with Donziger, he told Donziger that his observational style of
filmmaking, which presents all sides of an argument and allows the audience to reach
its own conclusions, opposes that of “the standard environmental and human rights
advocacy” filmmaker. The magazine is no longer available online but the article is reprinted in the Crude production notes. See “Crude Realities,” by Joe Berlinger, CRUDE:
PRODUCTION NOTES, supra note 2. Berlinger stated that Donziger “was interested in
my kind of storytelling, even if it meant he could not control the outcome or the message.” Id. The Second Circuit mentioned Berlinger’s testimony to this effect and labeled it “self-serving.” Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 308 n.5. However, Berlinger’s article was
published in 2009, prior to Chevron’s petition. See Declaration of Joseph A. Berlinger,
supra note 116, ¶ 25.
151
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succeeded in convincing a Vanity Fair reporter to write a feature about
the case and in recruiting Sting and Trudie Styler to champion the
156
But the fact that
environmental cause of the Cofán nation.
Donziger brought the subject to Berlinger’s attention does not mean
that Berlinger lacked independence. The court’s fixation on the
origin of the idea for the film reveals ignorance of a common journalistic practice for both traditional journalists and prominent documen157
It is not unusual for subjects or those associated
tary filmmakers.
with them to bring ideas for films to well-known filmmakers without
demanding or obtaining any editorial control, particularly for obser158
Because the Second Circuit took this
vational documentaries.
common practice as evidence of Berlinger’s lack of independence—
and presumably would not find a similar lack of independence if, for
instance, a whistleblower brought a story idea to a member of the in159
stitutional media —the court created a scheme that treats filmmakers like Berlinger as second-class journalists.
156

See CRUDE, supra note 2.
Subjects or their representatives bring stories to members of the institutional
media all the time, and the Second Circuit has never before questioned the independence of those journalists based on where their story ideas originated. Consider, for
example, public relations professionals who actively seek media coverage for their clients, or whistleblowers who pitch stories to journalists.
158
See, e.g., Interview with D.A. Pennebaker, Documentary Filmmaker, in New Haven, Conn. (Sept. 3, 2003) (stating that the ideas for his films come to him almost exclusively from other people who approach him with topics and that thinking up ideas
without the help of others is “a waste of time”); Interview with Ricki Stern & Annie
Sundberg, Documentary Filmmakers, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 23, 2007) (explaining
that the idea for the legal documentary The Trials of Darryl Hunt came from a suggestion by an investigator working on the case for the defendant); see also Keith Phipps,
Albert Maysles: Altamont Revisited, A.V. CLUB (Oct. 18, 2000), http://www.avclub.com/
articles/albert-maysles,13682 (explaining that filmmakers Albert and Davis Maysles got
the idea for the film Gimme Shelter from another filmmaker associated with the Rollins
Stones); RICH EISEN, TOTAL ACCESS: A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE NFL UNIVERSE
215-16 (2007) (quoting an interview with filmmaker Steve Sabol, who said sportscaster
Howard Cosell approached him and said, “‘You should make a film about me!’ And
that’s what we did.”).
159
It is common for individuals and partisan organizations to pitch stories to traditional journalists, a practice which the Second Circuit presumably would not find destructive of editorial independence if the journalist were employed, for example, by
the New York Times. Nearly every activist organization with a website has a section for
press releases that are distributed to journalists in hopes of placing stories on the subject. See, e.g., Press Releases, AMAZON WATCH, http://amazonwatch.org/news/pressreleases (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (publicizing various environmental causes, and
hence story ideas, to journalists). Yet the distribution of press releases does not mean
that any resulting articles are automatically considered the product of the activist’s editorial control. Furthermore, beat reporters for institutional media companies operate
within a “culture in which journalists implicitly provide positive coverage in exchange
157
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The Second Circuit opinion also faulted Berlinger for removing a
160
scene at the request of plaintiffs’ counsel.
But the court, without
explanation, dismissed Berlinger’s contention that he had an editorial
justification for removing the scene and that he rejected other proposed changes, both of which indicate that he maintained editorial
161
As the Center for Social Media recently concluded in its
control.
report on the ethics of documentary filmmaking, it is common for
filmmakers to give subjects the opportunity to review a cut of the film
and make suggestions, without sacrificing their editorial independ162
ence. The study also noted that films can benefit from the input of
the subjects, just as films benefit from the opinions of producers or
163
One example provided in
other advisors who evaluate rough cuts.
for tidbits of news.” Dana Milbank, Rotten to the Press Corps, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2011,
at A15; see also Jack Shafer, Back Scratching, Washington Style, SLATE (Mar. 2, 2011, 6:16
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2287089 (describing how journalists will negotiate with
sources, perhaps implicitly, to provide positive coverage to ensure an ongoing relationship with a source). Presumably, courts would not question the independence of professional reporters who engage in such pervasive “back scratching.” However the Berlinger decision does raise the question of whether baldly partisan news outlets, such as
the New York Post or Fox News, could meet the independence requirement.
160
See Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 308 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that the
journalists’ privilege did not apply to Berlinger in large part because of the lack of independence supposedly evidenced by the deletion of the scene).
161
See id. at 304 (noting that Berlinger rejected other changes proposed by the
Lago Agrio plaintiffs); see also supra note 117 (recounting that Berlinger maintained
that he removed the scene for narrative clarity).
162
See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, HONEST TRUTHS:
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS ON ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN THEIR WORK 10-12 (2009),
available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/Honest_Truths_-_Documentary_Filmmakers_on_Ethical_Challenges_in_Their_Work.pdf (noting that
while filmmakers often try to accommodate their subjects’ requests to remove footage
if the filmmakers’ do not deem the footage to be essential to the story, most filmmakers obtain releases reserving for themselves ultimate editorial control). This is particularly true of observational documentaries, as opposed to investigative documentaries
that are composed largely of formal sit-down interviews. Filmmakers who spend great
lengths of time following subjects as they conduct their daily lives often form close relationships with the subjects, and some believe that their subjects deserve the courtesy
of reviewing the cut prior to distribution. See id. (describing several filmmakers’ decisions to remove or change scenes at the request of their subjects); see also Heidi Ewing
& Rachel Grady, Directors Uncut: Notes on One Team’s Process, DOCUMENTARY, Fall 2011,
at 22, 26 (“When our docs are nearly finished, we screen the work for [our subjects].
This private viewing is not an invitation for editorial changes but a respectful gesture
that fosters a frank discussion about the decisions we made in the edit. Here, grievances can be aired and any factual errors remedied before the film flies out of our
hands and into the world at large.”); CINEMANIA (Wellspring Media 2002) (ending the
documentary film with a scene of the film’s subjects, itinerate movie-goers, watching a
near-final cut of the film about themselves and reacting to their depictions).
163
See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 11.
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the study was that of filmmaker Ross Kauffman, director of the Acad164
emy Award-winning Born into Brothels, who removed a “coda” from
one of his films because the subjects maintained that the scene did not
“ring true” to who they were.165 Kauffman agreed and removed the
coda from the film, remarking, “They were much happier, I was much
166
In other words,
happier, and the film was better because of it.”
Kauffman was simply persuaded by his subjects’ argument; his decision to remove the scene was in no way compelled by his subjects’ editorial control of the film.
The Berlinger decision discourages filmmakers from accepting advice from subjects, even if making the changes would improve the
167
film’s clarity or accuracy. The presumption that accepting subjects’
advice suggests a lack of independence raises unique ethical questions
for documentary filmmakers. Filmmakers often form close, trustbased relationships with subjects during the intense and intimate film164

Ross Kauffman, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm1502104 (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011).
165
AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 11. A coda is a short scene that appears
after the closing credits of a film.
166
Id.
167
Removing a scene is similar to the common journalistic practice of correcting or
contextualizing a quotation after sending the quotation to the source for review, which,
again, would be unlikely to destroy independence in the eyes of the court if practiced
by a member of the institutional press. Journalists working on tight deadlines often do
not have the luxury of permitting sources to review quotations for inaccuracies. However, when time permits, the practice is allowed and is not uncommon. See, e.g., Handbook of Journalism: Independence, REUTERS, http://handbook.reuters.com/index.php
/independence (last updated Sept. 21, 2009) (allowing reporters to verify quotes and
information with sources, but warning against being unduly influenced by subjects).
Many organizations do not expressly allow subjects to review an article prior to publication, although they recognize that pieces are often created in a spirit of collaboration. See
Guidance: Access Agreements and Indemnity Forms, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/
editorialguidelines/page/guidance-access-agreements-summary (last updated Oct. 2010)
(noting that collaboration between journalists and subjects often happens in practice,
but that formal legal agreements that could compromise editorial integrity should be
avoided). The Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics directs journalists to
“act independently” of any obligation or interest “other than the public’s right to
know.” See Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.org/pdf/
ethicscode.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). But the Code cannot be taken to mean that
filmmakers are prohibited from excising any scene that is included in a rough cut of a
film. Although the district court was suspicious of Berlinger’s motivation for removing
the scene, Berlinger also had a plausible editorial explanation—narrative clarity—for
cutting the scene. See supra note 117. It is also worth noting that the deleted scene is
still included in the version of the film available for streaming on Netflix, and thus was
not entirely removed from public viewing. See Crude, NETFLIX, http://www.netflix.com/
Movie/Crude/70112742 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (allowing Netflix subscribers to
watch this version of Crude instantly).
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ing process, and believe that subjects have a right to review the film
prior to distribution because the subjects are the ones who must live
with the consequences that result from the public dissemination of
168
169
the intimate details of their lives. Filmmaker Gordon Quinn, who
requires his subjects to sign releases acknowledging that they will not
have any legal control over the final cut, nonetheless tells subjects:
“We will show [you] the film before it is finished. I want you to sign
the release, but we will really listen to you. But ultimately it has to be
170
Quinn’s statement recognizes that the documentary
our decision.”
film medium, due to its immediacy and vivid depictions of reality, carries with it special ethical obligations. Quinn’s solution is to reserve
his legal rights to editorial control but remain sympathetic to the
opinions and feelings of his subjects until those opinions and feelings
begin to interfere with his editorial convictions. The fact that a
filmmaker faces different ethical obligations than print journalists
should not make him any less able to invoke the journalists’ privilege
than are “lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers,
171
and dramatists,” all of whom qualify for protection under von Bulow.
In Berlinger, the Second Circuit focused on the different ethical
obligations and professional practices of filmmakers and traditional
institutional journalists to derive an independence requirement that
disadvantages filmmakers more than other journalists. The application of the independence requirement in Berlinger discounts the value
of the contributions documentarians make to the public debate, and,
in the name of respecting the underlying principles of the journalists’
privilege, frustrates the purposes of the privilege itself. A better ap168

See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 10-11. In many ways, a documentary
film, particularly an observational film, represents a more intimate and often more revealing portrait than a print media profile because the film depicts actual images and
sounds of the subject. Some documentarians believe that this heightened intimacy triggers ethical considerations not present in the print journalist–subject relationship. See,
e.g., Interview by John Ellis with Roger Graef, Documentary Filmmaker, in Phila., Pa.
(Feb. 25, 2011) (discussing how Graef pulled a documentary from BBC prior to broadcast because of objections by the family of a child depicted in the film, based not on
legal but ethical considerations).
169
Gordon Quinn is the artistic director and co-founder of Kartemquin Films.
Gordon Quinn, KARTEMQUIN FILMS, http://kartemquin.com/about/gordon-quinn (last
visited Dec. 15, 2011). Kartemquin is a Chicago-based production company known for
its award-winning documentaries Hoop Dreams, The Interrupters, At the Death House Door,
and Stevie. Films, KARTEMQUIN FILMS http://www.kartemquin.com/films (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011).
170
AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 10.
171
Von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972)).
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proach would be for courts to accept how technology has altered the
practice of journalism and construct a test that does not discriminate
against new technological forms. A film detailing the environmental
impact of decades of oil production deserves as much protection as an
article on the same subject, and courts should not justify interfering
with the journalistic function of documentary filmmakers on the basis
of differing best practices and ethical considerations.
B. Fishing for Precedent
The language of the Second Circuit’s decision in Berlinger belied
the scarcity of precedent for the new independence requirement and
severed the word “independent” from its accepted meaning in the
context of the press. Applying the von Bulow test, the district court
had “assume[d]” that the privilege applied to Berlinger as a filmmaker
because he investigated a newsworthy event with the intent to dissem172
inate his film to the public. But the Second Circuit read von Bulow
to contain an additional requirement: “[W]e spoke of the interest being protected as the public’s interest in being informed by ‘a vigorous,
173
aggressive and independent press.’” Although independence was never central to the holding in von Bulow, nor cited as a required element
174
by subsequent circuits adopting or referencing the test, in Berlinger
the Second Circuit implied von Bulow held independence as an essential element of the test for the journalists’ privilege. When discussing
Gonzales, the court admitted that independence was not a factor in
that case but, without citing textual support, similarly asserted that
“our discussion assumed that the press entity was acting with inde175
In fact, Gonzales itself summarized von Bulow without
pendence.”
reference to independence: “In von Bulow v. von Bulow we stated that
172

In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144).
174
See, e.g., Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing the von Bulow test as inquiring whether the claimant seeking protection “intended ‘at the inception of the newsgathering process’ to use the fruits of his research
‘to disseminate information to the public’” (quoting von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144)); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d 125, 129-30 (3d
Cir. 1998) (adopting the von Bulow test without mention of an independence requirement and remarking that a person may invoke the privilege if his or her purpose is
“gathering news for publication”); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir.
1993) (adopting the von Bulow test in the case of an investigative book author without
mention of independence and stating that “[w]hat makes journalism journalism is . . .
its content”).
175
Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 309.
173
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so long as an entity gathers information with ‘intent to disseminate to
176
the public,’ it may avail itself of the journalists’ privilege . . . .”
The Second Circuit’s only authority for its new concept of “independence” was a snippet of a single sentence from its 1992 decision in
177
178
Baker v. F & F Investment, later quoted in Gonzales and von Bulow,
which described the justification for the creation of journalist shield
179
laws in New York and Illinois. Those laws, the Baker court wrote, “reflect a paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous,
aggressive and independent press capable of participating in robust,
unfettered debate over controversial matters, an interest which has
180
When
always been a principal concern of the First Amendment.”
courts and commentators discuss the “independence” of the press,
they overwhelmingly use the term in reference to freedom from government control or obstruction of journalism by some other authority
with censorship power—not to describe a journalist’s freedom from
181
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, cited by
influence by a subject.
176

Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (quoting von
Bulow, 811 F.2d at 143).
177
194 F.3d at 33.
178
811 F.2d at 144.
179
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972).
180
Id. Interestingly, New York’s own shield law defines a “professional journalist”
without any reference to independence from subjects: a professional journalist is “one
who . . . is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping
or photographing of news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency . . . or
other professional medium or agency which has as one of its regular functions the
processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to the public.” N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6)(McKinney 2010).
181
See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 129 n.4 (1982) (White,
J., dissenting) (recounting one of the respondent’s arguments that “[t]here is no such
thing as a free and independent press within the union” when the incumbent officers
governing the organization also control the union newspaper (emphasis added));
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (reciting past
governmental attempts to regulate the press and concluding “there is obviously a continuing need for an independent press” to, among other things, expose corruption and
keep the public informed (emphasis added)); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 602 (1953) (“By interpreting to the citizen the policies of his government and vigilantly scrutinizing the official conduct of those who administer the
state, an independent press stimulates free discussion and focuses public opinion on issues and officials as a potent check on arbitrary action or abuse.” (emphasis added));
United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 2000) (asserting that a judicial order to reveal a confidential source sought by the prosecutor would threaten the public
interest in an independent press); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 988 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“To the extent that the independent exercise of editorial functions is threatened by governmental action, the very foundations of the architectural masterpiece that is our form
of government are shaken . . . .” (emphasis added)), rev’d on other grounds, 441 U.S. 153
(1979); Sikelianos v. City of New York, No. 05-7673, 2008 WL 2465120, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
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Baker, the Supreme Court, discussing the press and freedom of speech
expressed concern about the government “placing . . . a handicap up182
on the freedoms of expression,” and praised the “unfettered inter183
change of ideas” and “free political discussion” as “essential to the
184
security of the Republic.”
These notions of encouraging a marketplace of ideas and facilitating self-governance with a well-informed
public—two oft-cited theoretical justifications for the freedoms of
185
speech and the press —thus inform the Baker court’s use of the word
“independent” and underscore the misreading by the Second Circuit
186
in Berlinger.
The Second Circuit did not explain how courts should assess in187
dependence, but the court offered “an illustrative example.” Imagine, the court instructed, two individuals, Smith and Jones, both invesJune 18, 2008) (stating that granting “unfettered access to ‘sift through [journalists’]
files’ . . . would undermine the public’s perception of the press as an independent institution and foster the view that it is ‘an investigative arm of the judicial system, the government, or private parties’” (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36)); Ofosu
v. McElroy, 933 F. Supp. 237, 240 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he opposition press remains vigorous and unrestrained by the government . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United Food & Commercial Workers Local 919 v. Ottaway
Newspapers, Inc., No. 90-0592, 1991 WL 328466, at *3 (D. Conn. Nov. 12, 1991) (noting that the “function of the press . . . has never been conceived as anything but a private enterprise, free and independent of government control and supervision” (emphasis
added)).
A number of other judicial voices concur that independence of the press refers to
the media’s relationship with the government. See David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the
Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 232-34 (describing the historical practice
of official licensing of the press and concluding that such a practice precluded the possibility of an independent press); Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,
634 (1975) (discussing the origins of the First Amendment and asserting the “primary
purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was . . . to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official branches”).
182
376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
183
Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
184
Id. (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
185
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-15, 493-95 (3d ed.
2008) (collecting various scholars’ justifications for the freedoms of speech and the
press, including several noting the democracy-reinforcing effect of the free exchange
of ideas and the dangers inherent in government manipulation of information disseminated to the public).
186
Rather than speaking of independence, perhaps a more textually sound approach for the Second Circuit would be to conclude that, because Berlinger was subject
to influences by his sources, he was not engaged in activities “traditionally associated
with the gathering and dissemination of news.” Von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136,
142 (2d Cir. 1987). The court then could have stated that objectivity, rather than independence, was a prerequisite for claiming protection. For a discussion of why even this
argument would be descriptively questionable, see supra note 159 and infra note 198.
187
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2011).
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188

tigating and writing about a public official.
Smith is entitled to
stronger protections if she undertakes the project “to discover whatever
she can through her investigations and to write a book that reflects
189
whatever her investigations may show.” Jones, by contrast, has been
“hired or commissioned to write a book extolling [the public official’s]
virtues and rebutting his critics,” and promoting “a particular point of
190
The court
view regardless of what her investigations may reveal.”
191
concluded that Jones is entitled to little or no protection.
The
court’s hypothetical suggests that even if Smith and Jones engaged in
identical research techniques and produced identical books, Jones
would receive less protection merely due to the source of her paycheck
or her mindset while writing the book. The court provided no explanation why a person’s employer, mindset, or professional associations
should be relevant to determining the applicability or strength of the
journalists’ privilege, which was designed to safeguard the free flow of
information from sources to news gatherers to the public.
The implication of the hypothetical is not encouraging for journalists outside of the institutional media. The court seemed to conclude that Berlinger was a Jones rather than a Smith, when in fact
there was no evidence at all that Berlinger was hired to advocate a particular point of view or that he was subject to the editorial control of
192
If the Second Circuit’s test was designed to
Donziger or others.
weaken or eliminate the privilege for filmmakers who were commissioned by subjects to present a biased film and who ceded editorial
control to those subjects, then the court was fashioning a solution to a
193
problem that, in Berlinger’s case, did not exist.
188

Id.
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
I submit that the Jones-type character is capable of producing an objective work
of journalism even if she has a particular agenda in mind during her investigation. At
the very least, the hypothetical should recognize a third character, representing a middle ground. Such a character can set out to create a film or article at the suggestion of a
subject and incorporate the subject’s ideas without sacrificing editorial objectivity.
193
The court's independence requirement seems tailored to much more baldly
partisan filmmaking than that practiced by Berlinger. Perhaps in writing the opinion,
Judge Leval was more concerned about political films such as Hillary: The Movie, which
was the subject of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010),
or—although it would not be created until the 2012 presidential Republican primary—When Mitt Romney Came to Town, a 28-minute “documentary-style attack film” made
by a “Republican operative” and broadcast in South Carolina using funds from a “pro[Newt] Gingrich super PAC.” See David Carr, Hollywood Techniques at Play in Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2012, at B1. Focusing more explicitly on the funding sources for
189
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Furthermore, the court placed the burden of proving independ194
ence on the person claiming the privilege.
If Berlinger was unable
to pass the independence test, it is unclear how many other documentarians would be able to meet this burden. The Second Circuit’s deci195
sion implies that complete financial independence, signed releases
196
by subjects waiving rights to editorial control, and declarations that
the filmmaker rejected editorial suggestions by the subject are all insuf197
ficient to prove independence.
Likewise, independence cannot be
inferred by the inclusion of material that shows the subject in an unfa198
Presumably, a documentary filmmaker who develops
vorable light.
an idea for a film without any suggestion from her subjects, and who
denies those subjects the opportunity to review or comment on the
199
But denying the
film prior to release, would pass the Berlinger test.
privilege to filmmakers on the basis of where an idea originated or
upon whose final cut advice the filmmaker accepts uncouples the test
from the core purpose that the privilege was designed to protect—the
unfettered flow of newsworthy information to the public.
Other courts have declined to probe into an individual’s motivation
for gathering information beyond what von Bulow requires. These
courts recognize that assessing the origins and motivations of a journalistic work is perilous, as is distinguishing between scrupulous journalism and advocacy. For example, one California appellate court

films, however, might be a better, if imperfect, way to distinguish paid propaganda
from films like Crude.
194
Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 309.
195
There was never any assertion that Donziger or the other plaintiffs’ lawyers
bankrolled Berlinger’s film.
196
See In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d. 283, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (describing the release forms Berlinger had his subjects sign).
197
See Declaration of Joseph A. Berlinger, supra note 116, ¶ 33 (testifying that Berlinger rejected all but one editorial suggestion made by the plaintiffs’ lawyers).
198
See id. ¶ 32 (arguing that including scenes depicting Donziger’s “questionable
conduct” is evidence of Berlinger’s commitment “to creating an unbiased” portrait “of
the people and events surrounding the Lago Argio Litigation”); see also CRUDE, supra
note 2 (depicting questionable interactions between Donziger and a judge and other
government officials); supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
199
Berlinger’s independence test might even disqualify institutionalized journalists.
A journalist using leaked information from a confidential source might be said to lack
independence if the journalist knows that the publication of such information will
serve the source’s personal or political goals. A reporter for Fox News, for instance,
also might be denied the privilege if she fashions a piece to serve the objectives of a
conservative politician featured in a television report. The court did not define objectivity for these purposes, nor did it explain how to characterize the interests of subjects
and journalists.
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stated as much in a case about website operators who posted information about forthcoming Apple products:
We decline the implicit invitation to embroil ourselves in questions of
what constitutes “legitimate journalis[m].” The shield law is intended to
protect the gathering and dissemination of news, and that is what petitioners did here. We can think of no workable test or principle that
would distinguish “legitimate” from “illegitimate” news. Any attempt by
courts to draw such a distinction would imperil a fundamental purpose
of the First Amendment, which is to identify the best, most important,
and most valuable ideas not by any sociological or economic formula,
rule of law, or process of government, but through the rough and tum200
ble competition of the memetic marketplace.

C. Overbroad Orders and Weakening the Relevance Requirement
Perhaps just as critical for documentary filmmakers, the Second
Circuit failed to correct the flaws in the district court’s reasoning and
left intact assertions and findings that may lead future courts astray
when considering outtakes. By treating outtakes differently from other evidence, the district court misapplied the Gonzales test and thereby
weakened the journalists’ privilege for documentary filmmakers. The
Second Circuit made this misstep in spite of the fact that the district
court assumed that the qualified privilege applied.
First, the order to turn over all six-hundred hours of outtakes was
overbroad on its face. The district court found that “[a]ny interaction” between the lawyers and experts, implicitly including interactions with members of the judiciary or other government agents,
201
“would be relevant.”
But the court did not limit the subpoena to
footage depicting interactions between the lawyers and relevant officials, nor did it limit the subpoena to footage containing the lawyers
202
Chevron made no
whose behavior Chevron sought to discredit.
showing and the court provided no explanation in ruling that footage
of other individuals (for example, members of the Cofán nation)
would be “likely relevant” to proving anything regarding the conduct
203
of the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Thus, the district court’s order lowered the
relevancy standard under Gonzales.

200

O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 97 (Ct. App. 2006) (alteration in
original).
201
In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
202
See id. at 299 (ordering that Berlinger turn over “the raw footage” of Crude).
203
See supra text accompanying notes 115-23 (tracing the district court’s application of the “likely relevant” standard to scenes in Crude).
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In a minor victory for Berlinger, the Second Circuit temporarily
narrowed the order by limiting discovery to footage that depicted cer204
tain key individuals. Because the Second Circuit did not limit its order to footage of the interactions of the lawyers with the experts or
other officials, or to footage of those individuals describing or strategizing about their interactions, the order still netted about eighty-five
205
percent of Berlinger’s footage, approximately five-hundred hours.
The Second Circuit, transforming Gonzales, sanctioned the use of a
lower standard of relevance for outtakes, because the order captured
any footage of any of the listed individuals, including footage with no
possible relevance to the issue of improper conduct on the part of the
206
plaintiffs’ lawyers. For instance, any footage of Donziger coaching a
member of the Cofán nation in preparation for a press conference
was discoverable under the Second Circuit’s order. Acknowledging
that its order would compel discovery of irrelevant material, the Second Circuit turned a Gonzales mandate into an aspiration: “While in
general it is desirable for a district court to tailor a production order to
material likely to be relevant, the district court lacked any reliable means
207
In other words, because Chevron could not articulate
of doing so.”
the specific behavior of which they sought evidence, they were re208
This reasoning severely
warded with access to all of the footage.
lowered, if not completely obliterated, the bar for relevance under
204

See Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, Nos. 10-1918, 10-1966 (2d Cir. July 15, 2010)
(order) (narrowing the required disclosure to footage involving counsel, experts, or
government officials).
205
Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, Documentary Filmmaker (Nov. 12,
2010).
206
The Second Circuit claimed that the Gonzales test did not apply to Berlinger.
See Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 309 (2d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Gonzales on the ground that independence was not an issue in that case). But by affirming
the district court’s opinion “in full,” id. at 311, the court arguably validated the district
court’s analysis of the test. It is unclear what precedential effect Chevron v. Berlinger will
have on Gonzales.
207
Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
208
The Second Circuit order reflected a lack of understanding about the technology of film outtakes too. And in reality the scope of the Second Circuit’s order was not
even as loosely tailored as it seemed. Berlinger had just two-and-a-half weeks to turn
over the footage, not even enough time to review the six-hundred hours of footage to
pull out the relevant five-hundred hours. Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger,
supra note 205. As a result, Berlinger “threw in the towel” and turned over more footage than necessary, including irrelevant footage, in order to comply with the deadline
set in the order. Id. A more narrowly tailored order likely would have required even
more time to comply. As a policy matter, the time-consuming nature of reviewing and
duplicating footage should be taken into account when fashioning discovery order
deadlines.
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Gonzales and created an incentive for parties to phrase discovery re209
quests broadly. Gonzales itself warned that litigants should not be allowed “to sift through press files in search of information supporting
their claims,” because such disclosure “would burden the press with
heavy costs of subpoena compliance,” impair its ability to perform its
duties, and bestow upon it the appearance of being “an investigative
210
At best, the scenes in the final cut of
arm of the judicial system.”
Crude indicate the possible relevance of outtakes, a showing that would
have been insufficient to compel discovery in the past.
Next, the district court ruled that Chevron had met its burden to
show that the evidence in the outtakes was not available from other
sources because Berlinger had been granted “almost unprecedented
access” to the plaintiffs’ attorneys and “[t]he raw footage he compiled
would be ‘unimpeachably objective’ evidence of any misconduct on
the part of the plaintiffs’ counsel, expert witnesses, or the [Govern-

209

In all other previous cases, outtakes were much more clearly relevant to known
events or material already in the record. For instance, in United States v. Cutler, a criminal case, outtakes of an interview with a lawyer were deemed directly relevant because
the underlying suit concerned whether the lawyer violated an order not to discuss certain topics with the media; so the process of filming was potentially the crime itself. 6
F.3d 67, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1993). In Gonzales v. NBC, petitioners sought footage to contextualize an event known to have taken place—the traffic stop of the NBC reporter—as
evidence of a pattern of behavior by the defendant police officer. 194 F.3d 29, 30-31,
36-37 (2d Cir. 1999).
Even the First Circuit case of United States v. LaRouche Campaign, which granted
perhaps the most speculative discovery of outtakes of any federal court, was directly
relevant to testimony already given in court. 841 F.2d 1176, 1179 (1st Cir. 1988). This
appeal arose out of a “pretrial ruling enforcing a subpoena of a third-party witness in
connection with a pending criminal prosecution” of Lyndon LaRouche, a presidential
candidate in 1984. Id. at 1177. The district court ordered NBC to submit outtakes of
an interview with Forrest Lee Fick, a consultant to the LaRouche campaign. Id. The
interview allegedly included statements that contradicted testimony Fick gave in the
trial of Roy Frankhauser, another consultant to the campaign. Id. Frankhauser was
convicted of obstruction of justice relating to his efforts to prevent a grand jury from
gathering evidence on mail and wire fraud counts. Id. On appeal, the First Circuit
held that outtakes from a 100-minute television interview with Fick, a key witness in
LaRouche’s pending criminal case, of which only one minute aired, “likely covered a
wide range of subject matter” and might show bias or reveal statements inconsistent
with his previous trial testimony. Id. at 1177, 1179-80. Chevron, by contrast, was not
looking to establish a general practice or pattern by the lawyers, nor to impeach testimony already in the record of a companion case, but rather was looking for evidence
of specific improper conduct uncorroborated by other evidence. This fact is particularly confounding because of the ample evidence that Chevron obtained through other
§ 1782 motions alleging misconduct by the lawyers. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
210
Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 35.
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211

ment of Ecuador].”
While the district court’s description of Berlinger’s access was accurate, such access alone does not indicate that
212
no other evidence of wrongdoing was available. The Second Circuit
explicitly made this observation in 1996: “[I]t cannot be said that pertinent material is not obtainable elsewhere just because it is included
213
in some out-takes.”
Chevron’s § 1782 actions in other jurisdictions make the unavailability claim even less plausible. Although Berlinger did not raise and
the district court did not consider these other motions, Chevron
brought § 1782 actions in more than a dozen U.S. jurisdictions to obtain evidence of misconduct by plaintiffs’ lawyers, and each motion
yielded at least some discovery.214 Chevron’s efforts, beginning in
2009, uncovered thousands of documents that would establish a prima
facie case that Donziger and others associated with the plaintiffs
215
Had Chevron ad“ghostwrote” the Lago Agrio damages report.
duced some of this independent evidence suggesting specific behavior
by the plaintiffs’ attorneys during Berlinger’s filming, the district court
could have soundly concluded that the footage was “likely relevant” to
Chevron’s defense, but it also might have concluded that evidence of
the lawyers’ misconduct was available from these other sources. In
light of this evidence, the district court appears to have guessed correctly that the outtakes contained evidence of misconduct. But, by allowing Chevron to subpoena Berlinger’s footage without having to
first produce any of the evidence, the court baited the hooks for fu216
ture fishing expeditions the likes of which courts have decried.
211

In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
For instance, the court ignored Berlinger’s claim that Chevron’s attorneys often had their own cameras capturing the same events witnessed by Berlinger and his
crew—a potential alternate source of evidence. Id.
213
Krase v. Graco Children Prods., Inc. (In re Application to Quash Subpoenas to
NBC), 79 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 1996).
214
See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 783 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (referring to Chevron’s § 1782 proceedings throughout the country).
215
In re Application of Chevron Corp., Nos. 10-0208, 10-0209, 2010 WL 5173279, at
*9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 276 (3d. Cir. 2011); see also
Roger Parloff, Evidence of Fraud Mounts in Ecuadorian Suit Against Chevron, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 13, 2010, 10:43 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/13/news/international/
chevron_ecuador_litigation.fortune/index.htm (discussing the breadth of documents
available to Chevron and testimony on the issue of misconduct by the lawyers).
216
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp.
667, 669, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (suggesting that “such a request to compel disclosure of
media files for this sort of fishing expedition should not lightly be granted” and that a
motion “at most based on a hypothesis or ‘hunch,’ lacking a logical basis” is “insufficient” to show relevance).
212
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Chevron’s actual showing in this case should have failed either the
“likely relevant” prong or the unavailability prong of the Gonzales
217
test.
What remains of the Gonzales test, then, is one basic inquiry:
whether the outtakes are “likely relevant” to the proceeding. In the
realm of documentary filmmaking, the court effectively abandoned
any meaningful inquiry into alternate sources of evidence prior to
compelling discovery of journalistic work product and also lowered
the standard for relevance by granting such a broad order. Protection
for nonconfidential information, at least for documentary filmmakers,
has been dealt a serious blow by the Berlinger cases.
D. Impeachable Outtakes
The district court opinion further reveals a lack of conceptual
clarity about the nature of outtakes which, if uncorrected, could lead
future courts to treat outtakes differently from other types of evidence
without adequate justification. Using language that posits outtakes as
“unimpeachably objective” encourages judges and jurors to place undeserved trust in photographic evidence, which will lead to its underprotection. Courts that embrace this exceptionalism of outtakes al218
But if courts better understood the
most always compel discovery.
filmmaking process and the influence that the act of filming has on
subjects and conducted a more searching analysis of what outtakes do
or do not contain, they would conclude that outtakes should be treated
with as critical an eye as any other kind of evidence. Although it is
tempting to view outtakes as an unbiased record of events, outtakes
are in fact far more subjective and incomplete than courts recognize.
The district court’s language in the Berlinger case occasionally failed
to distinguish the physical film, videotape, or digital file (the “outtakes”) from the information contained within the outtakes. The district court framed one issue as “whether there is sufficient ground to
217

See Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999).
See Tuley, supra note 83, at 1825-32 (arguing that this view of outtakes leads to
less stringent applications of discovery standards and makes it more likely that outtakes
will receive different treatment as compared to other evidence); see also United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1180 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that a subpoena for
outtakes was appropriate, in part because “[n]o other source (by definition) [was]
available”); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1980) (describing
outtakes as “[b]y their very nature . . . not obtainable from any other source” because
“[t]hey are unique bits of evidence that are frozen at a particular place and time”);
United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 159-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing outtakes
as demonstrating “with extraordinary clarity” behavior by government agents).
218
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believe that the footage petitioners seek would not reasonably be obtainable elsewhere,”219 while the proper inquiry should have been
whether the information contained within the outtakes was obtainable
elsewhere. Even when the district court properly distinguished outtakes from their content, the court conflated the outtakes with the
underlying allegations that petitioners sought to prove: “Petitioners
cannot reasonably be expected to identify with particularity the outtakes that they seek where knowledge of their content lies exclusively
220
The court’s statement here seems to suggest that
with Berlinger.”
Chevron could not articulate what conduct it sought to prove without
knowing what the outtakes depicted. This confusion—which posits
outtakes as unique evidence either inseparable from their content or
from the underlying allegations of wrongdoing—leaves a textual trail
that could lead future courts to apply the Gonzales test improperly and
thus carelessly underprotect outtakes.
To be sure, film and video footage enjoys a nexus to reality that
distinguishes them from other kinds of evidence and “differing treatment based on the intrinsic nature of the medium is not necessarily
221
offensive.”
But the way the Second Circuit has distinguished outtakes from other kinds of evidence—describing footage as “unim222
peachably objective evidence” —represents a simplistic and problematic view of the video medium and encourages courts to hold
outtakes to a different standard than other kinds of evidence. This
unquestioned belief in the objectivity of video evidence may lead
judges and jurors to erroneous conclusions.
While it is tempting to view photographs and video as objective evidence—indeed, photographic records do document exactly what was
in front of the camera at the time of recording—it is nonetheless intuitive to treat outtake evidence critically, rather than as “unimpeachably objective.” One common criticism of observational documentary
filmmaking—of which Berlinger is, to a degree, a practitioner—is that
the premise that filmmakers can observe what is being recorded without influencing the events and the subjects of the camera’s gaze is a
fallacy. This observational impact should cause us to question the very

219

In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(emphasis added).
220
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
221
Tuley, supra note 83, at 1833.
222
Gonzales 194 F.3d at 36.
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223

truth of what the films purport to capture.
In 1985, the Southern
District of New York warned that the evidentiary value of statements
depends on the context in which they are made:
[H]abitues of saloons and guests at talk shows are usually not placed under oath, and in both cases temptations are great for exaggeration and
for the speaker placing himself in the most favorable light. The resulting
information in each case is likely to be of little or no evidentiary value in
224
court.

Courts should treat documentary footage—particularly outtakes—with
the same skepticism. During the production of any documentary,
filmmakers inevitably will find a subject altering his behavior for the
225
benefit of the camera, perhaps making contrived statements to appear how he wishes to be viewed or self-consciously attempting to portray himself in the most favorable light. It is the job of the filmmaker,
during the editing process, to recognize which moments seem genuine and minimize the use of those that seem contrived for the camera
226
in the final film. If the judgment of the filmmaker is to be trusted,
there may be more reason to doubt the authenticity of statements and
227
behavior in outtakes than those in the final cut of the film.
Another widely accepted truism about documentary filmmaking is
that the editing process introduces manipulation and bias in the film’s
223

See, e.g., WILLIAM ROTHMAN, Alfred Guzzetti’s Family Portrait Sittings (“We cannot take for granted the authenticity of what is in the frame, because our means of access to it may be deeply implicated in its appearance.”), in THE “I” OF THE CAMERA:
ESSAYS IN FILM CRITICISM, HISTORY, AND AESTHETICS 304, 305 (2d ed. 2004).
224
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 667,
671 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
225
See BARRY HAMPE, MAKING DOCUMENTARY FILMS AND REALITY VIDEOS 41-42
(1997) (observing that since “[w]e expect people to act differently in different situations . . . it is not surprising if people alter their behavior in front of a documentary
crew and camera,” but because “[m]ost people just aren’t very good actors[,] . . . if
they start out playing a role, they’ll soon fall back on their normal pattern of behavior”
(emphasis omitted)).
226
See, e.g., id. at 296 (recommending that filmmakers discard footage “in which
someone was mugging at the camera” as well as other footage that implies something
untrue or unfair); Interview by John Ellis with Roger Graef, supra note 168 (discussing
the practice of stopping filming or editing out moments when subjects directly address
or “mug” for the camera).
227
Filmmakers may choose to discard footage for any number of reasons, including if a subject is acting for the benefit of the camera, if the footage gives the wrong
impression without proper context, or if the outtakes needlessly confuse the simplified
narrative that the filmmaker constructs while editing hundreds of hours of footage
down to a final cut. Filmmakers who hold themselves to certain journalistic and
filmmaking standards of professional behavior and ethics, by behaving in accordance
with documentary norms, stand to be harmed the most by the Berlinger rulings.
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228

presentation of reality.
But the same could be said of the mental
“editing” process that occurs when the filmmaker initially chooses
when, where, and what to record. Just as a film presents only a portion of the captured footage, outtakes capture only a portion of real
events—the portion the camera recorded—and courts must be careful
not to assume too much about what has and has not been recorded.
The real-time nature of documentary film production ensures that
filmmakers will miss capturing some key moments or statements.
Outtakes may include a statement without capturing the subject’s caveat about what he intended to say or a damaging assertion without
the subject’s later recantation. Outtakes may not fully represent the
context of certain statements, thus failing to alert uncritical viewers
that, for example, a statement was made in jest. The very phrase “unimpeachably objective evidence” discourages viewers from thinking
critically about what outtakes do and do not show and invites a lower
level of scrutiny than is applied to other testimonial evidence.
Filmmakers should have the opportunity to raise these issues, and
judges should be open to the idea that outtakes are less reliable than
they may initially appear.
Professor Jessica Silbey has argued forcefully that photographs
and other visual documentary evidence should be subject to the criti229
cal analysis applied to all other evidence. Drawing from film theory
and semiotics,230 Silbey and others generally conclude that the audience
“provide[s] the photograph’s meaning; its significance does not originate from the photograph’s referentiality but from what we currently
231
Those who recognize the limitations of
use it for in our world.”
photographic evidence do not claim that photographs are inherently
unreliable, but they do acknowledge that photographs and video evidence can “attract false beliefs” and “make us think we know more
228

See, e.g., Barry Keith Grant, Truth or Dare: Theoretical and Ethical Considerations,
FILM REFERENCE, http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/Criticism-Ideology/
Documentary-TRUTH-OR-DARE-THEORETICAL-AND-ETHICAL-CONSIDERATIONS
.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (“[T]he nature of the film medium ensures that the
hand of the maker must always work over the raw material on the editing table.”).
229
See Silbey, Evidence Verité, supra note 83, at 1297-98 (suggesting changes aimed
at “minimizing the potential for unconscious or less-than-deliberative responses to . . .
films”); see also Silbey, Judges as Film Critics, supra note 83, at 519 (criticizing judges for
describing film “as if it were an unimpeachable eyewitness”).
230
See generally Silbey, Evidence Verité, supra note 83, at 1262-72, 1298 (summarizing the intellectual contributions of Roland Barthes, Stanley Fish, William Mitchell,
Errol Morris, Lennart Nilsson, Susan Sontag, John Tagg, and others on the questions
of what photographs do, say, and “want”).
231
Id. at 1296.
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232

than we really know.” Errol Morris, a noted documentary filmmaker
who has written essays on this topic for the New York Times, argues that
“[p]hotographic evidence—like all evidence—needs to be seen in
context. It needs to be evaluated. If seeing itself is belief-laden, then
there is no seeing independent of believing, and the ‘truism’ has to be
233
reversed. Believing is seeing and not the other way around.”
Treating outtakes as a unique class of evidence tends to favor disclosure because judges will instinctively want to admit evidence that
they believe is conclusive as to the issue at hand. But in reality, outtakes are less objective than many judges believe. If journalistic work
product is worth protecting in order to maintain a vigorous and independent press, then it should be worth protecting for filmmakers and
other journalists alike. Cavalier enforcement of subpoenas for outtakes jeopardizes society’s important goal of maintaining a free press.
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR FILMMAKERS
What is the significance of a weakened privilege for outtakes? Berlinger and other interested parties argued to the Second Circuit that
upholding the district court’s order would have a chilling effect on
Berlinger’s ability to find subjects willing to appear in documen234
taries. Concern about a chilling effect impeding the free flow of information to the public has been part of the conversation about the
journalists’ privilege from its inception, and courts continue to raise
235
and debate this issue in privilege cases. Unsurprisingly, filmmakers
232

Errol Morris, Will the Real Hooded Man Please Stand Up, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR
BLOG (Aug. 15, 2007, 6:13 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/
will-the-real-hooded-man-please-stand-up. See generally ERROL MORRIS, BELIEVING IS
SEEING: OBSERVATIONS ON THE MYSTERIES OF PHOTOGRAPHY 75-95 (2011) (revisiting
and expanding on the questions explored in his articles).
233
Morris, supra note 232; see also HAMPE, supra note 225, at 30 (responding to the
claim that “the camera doesn’t lie” as “nonsense” and noting that “only the mind of
the viewer, making inferences from these shadows and color patterns, . . . gives [footage] meaning”).
234
See Brief and Special Appendix for Respondents-Appellants Joseph A. Berlinger
et al. at 22-23, 35, Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 101918, 10-1966) (arguing that requiring Berlinger to produce outtakes would have “a
chilling effect on his ability—and the ability of other journalists—to develop relationships with sources and to make documentaries reporting on important and newsworthy topics”); see also Brief of Int’l Documentary Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Appellants at 14-17, Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (Nos. 10-1918, 10-1966) (“If subjects fear
that their outtakes may be taken out of context and used against them by their adversaries in litigation, they will be less willing to participate.”).
235
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) (discussing the concern
that “the flow of news will be diminished by compelling reporters” to testify before

ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

The Future of the Journalists’ Privilege

2/15/2012 7:08 PM

907

and journalists have also voiced this concern in reaction to the Ber236
linger litigation.
Some courts and commentators are skeptical of the chilling ef237
fect. Indeed, one scholar, Randall Eliason, argues that because journalism flourished for many years prior to the invention of the journalists’ privilege, a privilege is not necessary to safeguard the free flow of
238
Eliason maintains that because sources who disclose
information.
sensitive information face many potential risks, a chilling effect could
only be present when a source, who is otherwise willing to accept
those risks, is deterred exclusively by the possibility of his or her ingrand juries); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 299, 301-02 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the private interest of
the party seeking disclosure “pales in comparison to the public’s interest in avoiding
the chilling of disclosures” that can result when journalists are forced to disclose confidential information); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st
Cir. 1988) (“We discern a lurking and subtle threat to journalists and their employers
if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and other unused information, even if nonconfidential,
becomes routine and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled.”); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470
F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a journalist’s ability to secure information . . . . The deterrence effect [of] such disclosure . . . threatens freedom of the press and the public’s need to be
informed.”); Ayala v. Ayers, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1251 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (limiting a motion to compel discovery of a manuscript for an investigative book “in deference to the
goals of protecting the free flow of information and protecting the privacy of editorial
processes”).
236
See Dave Itzkoff, Michael Moore Says Judge’s Ruling Could Have ‘Chilling Effect’
on Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES ARTSBEAT BLOG (May 7, 2010, 9:06 AM), http://
www.artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/michael-moore-says-judges-ruling-couldhave-chilling-effect-on-documentaries (quoting filmmaker Michael Moore as arguing that
because of the ruling’s chilling effect, “the next whistleblower at the next corporation is
going to think twice about showing [a filmmaker] some documents if that information
has to be turned over to the corporation that they’re working for”); Amy Reiter, Documentary Filmmakers Rally Around CRUDE Director, SUNFILTERED (May 20, 2010), http://
www.sundancechannel.com/sunfiltered/2010/05/documentary-filmmakers-rally-aroundcrude-director (quoting filmmakers who argue that the district court’s ruling “surely
will have a crippling effect on the work of investigative journalists everywhere”).
237
See, e.g., Wolf v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 201 F. App’x 430,
433 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the “chilling effect” argument was ultimately rejected
by the Supreme Court, which stated that the lack of a “constitutional protection for
press informants” has “not been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of confidential news sources by the press” (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 699)).
See generally Jones, supra note 18, at 363-74 (presenting empirical data that fills the noted gap in the debate about whether the existence of a privilege makes any difference
in journalistic practices).
238
See Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers and Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided
Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 417-19 (2006) (distinguishing a potential journalist’s privilege from those privileges already recognized by
the law in that the former does not have the same “common law pedigree” and does
not so closely tie to “notions of personal liberty and privacy”).
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formation being revealed during litigation.
scholar, David Anderson, argues:
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By contrast, another

Where a reporter’s privilege exists, it seems to work not so much by
providing firm assurance that the law will not permit the particular confidence to be breached, but by leading sources to believe that reporters
will refuse to disclose and that anyone seeking to force them to disclose
240
will at least face some legal impediments.

Even if a privilege is not absolute, it is one of the tools that journalists can use to persuade sources to speak. Berlinger, for one, has
used his successful track record of quashing subpoenas for his out241
takes to convince new potential film subjects to agree to participate.
He specifically discussed this history with Donziger when the two con242
sidered making Crude. Now, Berlinger admits, “I can no longer look
at a subject square in the eye and say if you give me access, I can pro243
tect the footage.”
In recent years, individuals and organizations have gathered some
empirical support to prove the impact of subpoenas on the media and
the newsgathering process. Studies by scholars and the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, as well as congressional testimony, show that both the frequency of media subpoenas is increasing
244
and the effect is detrimental to the newsgathering process.
Evi239

See id. at 422-23 (arguing that such a possibility is so “remote” in regards to both
the probability of disclosure and the time that would pass between initial publication
and subsequent revelation of the source that it is unlikely to have a deterrent effect).
The risks a source in a leak case can face include: the journalist deliberately or inadvertently not honoring the promise of confidentiality; a source’s employer discovering
the source’s identity through an internal investigation that may involve conducting interviews under oath; and a source’s identity being uncovered to outside parties
through e-mails or telephone records other than those possessed by the journalist. Id.
at 423-25.
240
Anderson, supra note 24, at 907. For a lengthy list of articles arguing both sides
of the debate about the necessity of the journalists’ privilege, see Jones, supra note 18,
at 321 n.14, 324 nn.18 & 21.
241
Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205. In 1994, Berlinger
successfully fought two state court subpoenas to produce his Paradise Lost outtakes.
Declaration of Joseph A. Berlinger, supra note 116, ¶¶ 23-24.
242
Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205.
243
Id.
244
See generally Jones, supra note 18, at 353-98 (analyzing qualitative and quantitative survey data and concluding that a legal environment favoring media subpoenas
imposes enough burdens on the media and the public to warrant a federal shield law).
As of 2009, “[m]ore than a quarter of media organizations spen[t] more time and resources responding to subpoenas than they did five years [prior].” Id. at 354; see also
RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 626-66 (2008) (analyzing empirical data

ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

The Future of the Journalists’ Privilege

2/15/2012 7:08 PM

909

dence “suggests strongly that the recent wave of losing cases has led to
something of a nationwide chill,” that organizations fear the financial
and institutional burdens of challenging subpoenas, and that attor245
Studies also
neys are now “more willing to subpoena the press.”
show that, apart from the traditional chilling effect, the increase in
subpoenas has resulted in self-censorship or changes to the newsgath246
One
ering process that are potentially detrimental to the public.
survey found a “clear trend” that media organizations, which would
otherwise prefer to archive material, now systematically destroy notes
247
and outtakes soon after the publication or broadcast of stories. The
consequence of such destruction is a lack of long-term records on
people and topics, which makes it more difficult for journalists to
248
With
make connections between current events and past research.
newsroom budgets declining and resources diverted to defend against
an increasing number of subpoenas, media organizations have less financial and institutional resources to dedicate to investigative report249
Subpoenas, then, appear to have a negative impact on the
ing.
250
overall newsgathering process.
from a 2007 survey about media subpoena requests). In the 1990s, the vast majority of
media subpoenas, ninety-five to ninety-seven percent, were for nonconfidential information, according to four national studies by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press. See Fargo, supra note 71, at 356.
245
Jones, supra note 18, at 393-94; see also Belinda Baldwin, The Death of Objectivity?,
DOCUMENTARY, Fall 2010, at 34, 35 (“‘I was at my darkest hour,’ [Berlinger] recalls [after losing his privilege objection for the Crude outtakes], ‘questioning whether I had
the financial and emotional resources to fight . . . .’”).
246
See Jones, supra note 18, at 369 (noting that the specific examples included in
survey responses, as well as the general tone of responses, “suggest that the issuance of
subpoenas is negatively impacting relationships with potential confidential sources in a
variety of ways, ranging from the overt to the subtle”).
247
See id. at 364-65 (noting that several media organizations reported rarely retaining journalist notes “for more than a few days after publication”); see also infra Section
IV.C (discussing the consequences of destroying outtakes).
248
See Jones, supra note 18, at 365 (“The quick destruction of notes, footage and
other materials might impede investigative journalism by making it more difficult for a
newsroom to keep helpful long-term records on potentially ongoing stories or to report on a pattern of corruption or abuse that became evident only after earlier notes
or footage were destroyed.”).
249
See id. at 330, 356, 361-63 (noting that rising legal pressures and the recent
economic downturn have put an enormous strain on resource-strapped media organizations); see also Jones, supra note 244, at 648 (discussing how subpoenas and the risk of
court-ordered disclosure can affect newsroom assignments); Chelsea Ide & Kanupriya
Vashisht, Today’s Investigative Reporters Lack Resources, AZCENTRAL (May 28, 2006, 3:30
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special01/0528bolles-stateofreporting.html
(concluding, based on the results of an academic study about investigative reporting
units in newspapers, that fewer investigative teams exist today than in the past due to
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These empirical studies will not end the debates over the need for
a privilege or how journalism would function without it. But Berlinger himself says that the litigation over his outtakes already has
changed the way he plans to approach the filmmaking process in order to better protect his footage (and thus, his sources), to prevent
himself from facing this kind of litigation again, and to convince sub251
Filmmakers who conjects to participate in documentary projects.
tinue to tackle sensitive subjects will need to take steps to minimize
the risks to themselves and their subjects. However, many of the
methods filmmakers have considered employing are unlikely to provide the protection they seek.

the nontrivial resources they require, and pointing to “campaign[s] targeted at attacking the journalist who engages in investigative reporting” as an obstacle to institutional
investigative teams (internal quotation marks omitted)). As traditional media dedicate
fewer resources to long-form, in-depth investigative reporting, years-long documentary
investigations by filmmakers like Berlinger become even more valuable to the public.
Cf. Mary Walton, Investigative Shortfall, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Fall 2010, at 19 (noting in
particular the decline of investigative teams at traditional news organizations).
250
This raises a corollary question: to what extent should courts worry about the
chilling effect in the context of documentaries? The Berlinger litigation will only curb
documentary production to the extent that filmmakers or their subjects are aware of
the outcome of the case and are unwilling to participate in future documentary projects because of it. Lawyers, of course, are the individuals most likely to be aware of
the case and its implications, and thus the chilling effect will arguably be most pronounced for filmmakers trying to make documentaries about the legal system. Berlinger has expressed doubt over whether he will ever make another movie about a lawsuit. See Dave Itzkoff, Filmmakers Take Dual Roles in Quest for Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2012, at AR9.
While the benefits of a free press in general are widely accepted, the importance
of law-genre documentary films deserves reiteration. Compare Grosjean v. Am. Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (describing an “untrammeled press” as having shed
“more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity,” and noting that an “informed public opinion is the most potent of
all restraints upon misgovernment”), with Regina Austin, The Next “New Wave”: LawGenre Documentaries, Lawyering in Support of the Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy,
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 809, 817-21 (2006) (arguing that lawgenre documentaries “provide critical perspectives on the law, particularly as it is actually lived with and experienced,” put legal disputes in context in a powerful way, and
bring to life social and political realities that underlie legal disputes), and Charles
Musser, Film Truth, Documentary, and the Law: Justice at the Margins, 30 U.S.F. L. REV.
963, 984 (1996) (praising law-genre documentaries for forcing the public to reflect on
the American justice system).
251
See Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205 (discussing anticipated changes in his filmmaking).
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A. Confidentiality Options
One change Berlinger intends to make is to execute confidentiality
agreements with his subjects, promising to keep confidential any material not released to the public in the final cut of the film or released
on the DVD—in other words, promising to keep outtakes confiden252
tial. Assuming Berlinger can prove editorial and financial independence, he believes that this evidence of a confidential relationship would
qualify his footage for the higher judicial test of Cutler and other cases,
which requires petitioners to prove that outtakes are “highly material
and relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and
253
not obtainable from other available sources.”
In effect, Berlinger’s proposal would require courts to recognize a
new category of confidentiality. His subjects would not be considered
traditional confidential sources because their identities would be revealed in any footage used in the released film. Nor would the outtake footage be considered confidential information in the traditional
sense because, at the time of filming, the subjects did not communicate the information to Berlinger in confidence. Subjects would not
know which statements or recorded moments would be included in
the film, and thus, what would be subject to the agreement. What
Berlinger proposes is a new kind of confidentially, which I will refer to
as a “confidentiality option” because it bears a similarity to a stock option: it is exercisable by the filmmaker, with confidentiality vesting
when the footage is left out of the final cut.
Unfortunately, there is ample reason to doubt that courts would
endorse such confidentiality options. In the Berlinger litigation, the
district court noted that all of Berlinger’s subjects in Crude “appeared
on camera for the very purpose of having their images and words
shown publicly,” and because Berlinger retained absolute control over
the editing of the film, the subjects “could not possibly have [had] any
254
Other courts agree that inforunderstanding of confidentiality.”
mation must be conveyed and received in confidence to be protected.
252

Id.; see also Politics of Culture: Joe Berlinger’s ‘Crude’ vs Chevron, KCRW ( J une 8,
2010), http://www.kcrw.com/etc/programs/pc/pc100608joe_berlingers_crude (interviewing Berlinger and discussing his plans to employ formal confidentiality agreements
in his future documentary projects). Berlinger would also need to execute confidentiality agreements with everyone who has access to raw footage, including producers,
editors, sound technicians, cameramen, and assistants, in order to prove a true confidential relationship existed.
253
United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1993).
254
In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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In United States v. Smith, the Fifth Circuit found confidentiality to be
“absent” because an interview subject who spoke on camera with television reporters “wanted [the interview] aired when he gave it” and
had “no expectation . . . that any of the information he provided was
255
to be kept in confidence.” California appellate courts, which recognize the tort of breach of confidence in the commercial context, define a confidential idea as one which “is offered to another in confidence, and is voluntarily received by the offeree in confidence with
256
The
the understanding that it is not to be disclosed to others.”
Southern District of New York, in Cohen v. City of New York, held that
volunteers who videotaped arrests of protesters in connection with the
Republican National Convention in 2004 expected to release footage
depicting the arrests to defend protesters, and thus could not claim
257
The court shut the
that unpublished outtakes were confidential.
door on the idea that filmmakers could disseminate some footage but
expect to keep the rest confidential: “Though [the volunteers] may
have anticipated that they could disclose [their footage] selectively,
disseminating what would be helpful to their cause and retaining the
258
balance, this assumption was legally unwarranted.”
255

135 F.3d 963, 970, 972 (5th Cir. 1998).
Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 797 n.20 (Ct. App.
1990) (quoting Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (Ct. App. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257
255 F.R.D. 110, 114, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
258
Id. at 121. Nonjudicial sources also militate against recognizing this new kind
of conditional confidentiality. Wigmore’s treatise on evidence describes four conditions
that must be present before a confidential privilege exists: (1) the communications
must originate in confidence, (2) confidentiality must be essential to the relationship
between the parties, (3) the relationship must be one that the community believes
ought to be fostered, and (4) the costs of disclosure must outweigh the benefits. 8
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 ( J ohn T.
McNaughton ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1961); see also Fargo, supra note 71, at 361-62 (offering Wigmore’s view on confidentiality as an illustration of a “long legal history of
distrust toward testimonial and evidentiary privileges in general”). Even if filmmakers
using a confidentiality option could prove elements (3) and (4), they will not be able
to argue that the communications “originate in confidence,” because the confidentiality expressly attaches only after the filmmaker decides the footage will not be used in
the film.
Additionally, courts might choose to characterize confidentiality options as “contracts of silence” designed to suppress discovery of potential evidence, and therefore
find the agreements void. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 554 (1932) (stating that contracts to suppress evidence are illegal and unenforceable); see also Papago
Tribal Util. Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (stating that a contract suppressing evidence is void); 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 15:8, at 169 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed.
2010) (“The better rule is that all bargains tending to stifle criminal prosecution,
256
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In sum, then, it does not appear that use of confidentiality options
would alter the outcome in future outtake cases: once a filmmaker’s
subjects freely give him the ability to use their statements or show
their conduct, confidentiality is destroyed.
B. Final Cut Approval
Filmmakers will find it difficult to satisfy the Second Circuit’s independence requirement while also qualifying for the heightened
level of protection that accompanies confidentiality. Consider the
practice of filmmakers granting final cut approval to subjects. On the
one hand, giving subjects veto power over what footage is used
strengthens a filmmaker’s claim to a confidential relationship with the
subject, because the filmmaker must keep all footage private until obtaining the subject’s consent. At the same time, veto agreements
would tend to show a filmmaker’s lack of editorial independence,
prohibiting the filmmaker from qualifying for the journalists’ privilege
in the first place.
Granting approval rights to subjects is an impractical, undesirable,
and ethically questionable solution for most documentary filmmakers.
The administrative burden of obtaining approval from every subject
who appears in a film—or even from only the most important subjects—could be enormous, if not insurmountable. Subjects might
withhold consent for any number of reasons, from disliking their
physical appearance in a certain shot to rethinking the propriety of a
statement they had made in front of the camera. Thus, granting approval rights could lead to censorship of the film by its own subjects,

whether by suppressing investigation of crime or by deterring citizens from their public duty of assisting in the detection or punishment of crime, are void as against public
policy.”). For a detailed discussion of contracts of silence, see Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1998). Garfield notes that while some contracts of silence are enforced in the commercial context, rarely are they upheld outside of the context of trade secrets. Id. at 304-05, 31213. Garfield also recommends that courts decline to enforce contracts of silence when
there is an overriding public interest in the dissemination of the suppressed speech.
Id. at 314-15.
Finally, courts might dismiss confidentiality options simply as a formal ploy by
filmmakers seeking to obtain more deference from the courts, rather than a substantive agreement that alters the filmmaker-subject relationship. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 682 n.21 (1972) (“No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail
against demand for the truth in a court of justice.” (quoting WIGMORE supra, § 2286, at
528)); Cohen, 255 F.R.D. at 120 (“[T]he duty to provide evidence ‘has long been considered to be almost absolute.’” (quoting Klay v. All Defendants, 425 F.3d 977, 986
(11th Cir. 2005))).
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rendering documentaries less reliable, less objective, and less valuable
to the public.
Granting subjects approval rights might even block films from being broadcast and released or prevent filmmakers from pursuing their
projects altogether. Filmmakers often must obtain “errors and omissions insurance” before showing or distributing their films, and this
insurance requires filmmakers to secure signed releases from subjects
259
ceding complete editorial control. Filmmakers and distributors typically require these releases in order to preempt legal disputes when a
260
film is released or to ensure creative control over the final product.
Because it is so difficult to meet the Second Circuit’s independence requirement and since granting approval rights to subjects is not
a workable solution, independent filmmakers will find it nearly impossible to claim their footage is confidential and protected under the
heightened Cutler standard. Instead, even if documentarians can
demonstrate their editorial independence, the only protection they
will receive is likely the weakened standard of Gonzales, under which
outtakes are particularly vulnerable to discovery.
C. Destruction of Outtakes
To avoid disclosure in future litigation, print and television journalists now systematically destroy notes and outtakes after stories are
261
Documentarians, following the Berlinger decision, sugpublished.
gested that they, too, may destroy outtakes after their films are completed to avoid the expense and aggravation of responding to sub262
poenas and the potential legal harm that could befall their subjects.
But the destruction of footage carries significant costs for filmmakers,
litigants, and the public, and a legal doctrine that encourages the wide259

See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 10. Errors and omissions insurance
indemnifies producers against claims such as libel, invasion of privacy, defamation, and
copyright infringement. See Winnie Wong, E&O to the Rescue!, INT’L DOCUMENTARY
ASS’N (Feb. 2006), http://www.documentary.org/content/eo-rescue-0 (describing “E&O”
insurance and how filmmakers can obtain it).
260
See Wong, supra note 259.
261
See Jones, supra note 18, at 364-65 & nn.186-87 (reporting a “clear trend” in
newsrooms of destroying “materials used in the newsgathering process” within days after
publication and listing survey responses detailing different destruction policies).
262
See Itzkoff, supra note 236 (quoting documentary filmmaker Michael Moore
who claims that after Berlinger filmmakers might have to start getting rid of their extra
footage to avoid subpoenas); Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note
205 (describing the destruction of outtakes as “sadly . . . prudent”); Politics of Culture,
supra note 252 (suggesting in an interview that Berlinger will destroy outtakes).
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spread destruction of unused footage does not offer countervailing
benefits. At a minimum, subpoena rules should be crafted and enforced to legitimize the subpoena process in journalists’ minds so as to
discourage them from destroying footage to protect subjects.
Filmmakers and producers who destroy outtakes stand to lose a
revenue source because outtakes can be licensed to future content
263
producers.
Some filmmakers also use their own outtake footage in
later projects. Berlinger himself has directed three films about a
264
Each of the semurder trial in Arkansas—the Paradise Lost films.
quels contains footage that Berlinger shot during production of the
265
The destruction of outfirst film but did not include in that film.
takes makes it more difficult to produce such longitudinal studies or
266
new reports about people or events covered in the past.
Documentary footage, including outtakes, is also immensely valu267
able to the public and historians.
Testifying before a panel of the
263

See, e.g., Press Release, Getty Images, Getty Images Offers New Editorial Footage
Collection with Sky News (May 20, 2010), available at http://company.gettyimages.com/
article_display.cfm?article_id=221 (announcing that Getty’s documentary footage archive of more than 50,000 hours is available for licensing and distribution); Documentary, SCREEN VENTURES, http://www.screenventures.com/Documentary.htm (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011) (offering footage from various documentary projects for licensing); Explore Our Archives, MACNEIL/LEHRER PRODUCTIONS, http://home.macneil-lehrer.com/
explore-our-archives (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (offering stock documentary footage for
licensing); HBO ARCHIVES, http://www.hboarchives.com (last visited Dec. 15, 2011)
(making sports, entertainment, nature, and historical footage available for licensing).
Use of outtake footage in later documentary films is common. See, e.g., NO DIRECTION
HOME: BOB DYLAN (Spitfire Pictures 2005) (incorporating unreleased outtake footage
of Bob Dylan shot by D.A. Pennebaker in the 1960s in Martin Scorsese’s 2005 film
about Dylan); Bob Dylan: About the Film, PBS ( J une 28, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/
wnet/americanmasters/episodes/bob-dylan/about-the-film/574 (noting the film’s use
of Pennebaker’s outtakes).
264
See PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS (HBO 1996)
(covering a triple-homicide trial); PARADISE LOST 2: REVELATIONS (HBO 2000) (following up on the trial and investigating new evidence and ambiguities); PARADISE LOST
3: PURGATORY (HBO 2012) (documenting the efforts to obtain a new trial and the defendants’ subsequent release from prison after they entered Alford pleas, which allowed
them to plead guilty while maintaining their innocence).
265
See Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205 (describing subsequent use of footage not used in the original film).
266
See Jones, supra note 18, at 365 (discussing how destruction of notes and footage “in the name of avoiding . . . legal battles” increases the difficulty of reporting ongoing stories or presenting corruption or abuse that is evident only after original footage and notes are destroyed).
267
See Film Preservation Study: Washington, D.C. Public Hearing, February 1993, LIBR.
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/film/hrng93dc.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (including testimony before the National Film Preservation Board as to the historical and
educational value of outtakes and efforts to preserve them).

ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

916

2/15/2012 7:08 PM

[Vol. 160: 865

National Film Preservation Board in 1993 about the state of American
film preservation, distinguished documentary filmmaker Frederick
Wiseman asserted that outtakes may be of particular interest in future
centuries by those attempting “to reconstruct, know and understand
268
the way we live now.” Some institutions preserve documentary outtakes specifically for their historical value. For example, the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, part of the New York Public Library system, has preserved four million feet of unedited
269
documentary footage. Marie Nesthus, the principal librarian of the
Donnell Media Center of the New York Public Library, urged the
Board to focus on preserving “[u]nreleased titles and raw footage” because, when viewed by future generations, the footage “will provide
greater insights into the people and events of the past” and “will be
that upon which future generations of documentary filmmakers will
270
rely for their productions.”
Destroying outtakes also might unintentionally and undesirably
eliminate evidence that filmmakers actually want to disclose in court
proceedings. Filmmakers often voluntarily turn over outtakes when
they feel that discovery will not threaten vulnerable parties or breach
271
an ethical duty. In 2004, for instance, a murder suspect was exonerated when a lawyer found him in the background of outtakes for an
episode of the HBO comedy series Curb Your Enthusiasm shot live at a
272
In another famous example,
baseball game at Dodger Stadium.
Academy Award-winning documentary filmmaker Errol Morris, director of The Thin Blue Line, which revealed a miscarriage of justice and
ultimately contributed to the exoneration of a man on death row,

268

Id. (statement of Frederick Wiseman, Independent Filmmaker).
Id. (statement of Marie Nesthus, Principal Librarian, Donnell Media Center,
New York Public Library).
270
Id.
271
See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 245, at 34 (describing a case in which the filmmakers “were happy that [their] film could speak for” a subject killed after filming had
ended so as to “give her a voice in the trial”); E-mail from Joey Allen, Vice President of
Prod., Pangolin Pictures to author (Oct. 18, 2010, 3:18 PM) (on file with author) (describing Pangolin Pictures’ willing compliance with prosecution and defense subpoenas for outtakes from Jacked, a documentary series about the Newark Police Department’s auto-theft unit).
272
See Jeffrey Toobin, Face in the Crowd, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2004, at 34, 34-36.
Although the project was not conceived as a documentary, the footage shot at the
baseball stadium was effectively documentary footage of the crowd.
269
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handed over outtakes to the courts to prove the subject’s innocence.
These circumstances suggest another category of people—defendants
and victims—that would be harmed by the destruction of outtakes.
What journalists and filmmakers object to is “not so much the
principle of press subpoenas, nor even the increased volume in recent
years, but rather the frequency with which subpoenas are issued in
274
what reporters view as unnecessary circumstances.”
The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press survey found that journalists
most dislike subpoenas by “lazy” or “aggressive” attorneys seeking
seemingly cumulative evidence, or “fishing expeditions” that “indiscriminately ask[] for large amounts of material” and require “a com275
plete waste of manpower and materials” to ensure compliance. Berlinger himself has implied that he would not have appealed the
district court’s order if Chevron had not been granted access to his
276
“entire files.”
Outtakes offer value both to filmmakers and the public—as
sources of revenue, building blocks of future projects, historical documentation, and evidence to be used in litigation—and the journalists’ privilege should be constructed to protect journalistic work product well enough that reporters and filmmakers do not feel compelled
to destroy outtakes preemptively on a widespread basis. This cannot
be done unless courts require meaningful demonstrations of both relevancy and the unavailability of evidence from other sources before
they grant subpoenas for outtakes.
D. Alteration of Filmmaking Practices
Along the lines of destroying outtakes, Berlinger acknowledges
that he will be more careful in the future about what he records in the
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See Musser, supra note 250, at 963, 976 (reporting that Morris provided the court
with full transcripts of the interview outtakes to prove that Morris’s editing of the footage for the film was not unfairly manipulative).
274
Jones, supra note 18, at 381 (quoting Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege: An
Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 261 (1971)).
275
Id. at 381-83.
276
Court Orders Documentary Filmmaker to Hand Ecuador Footage to Chevron, DEMOCRACY NOW! (May 10, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/5/10/court_orders_
documentary_filmmaker_to_hand (stating Berlinger’s belief that the journalists’ privilege should only be pierced for specific, relevant material, which was not what was
done in the order).
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first place.
He will be more judicious in turning off the cameras
when subjects are, for instance, making off-color jokes unlikely to be
278
relevant to the film. Such an approach likely will come at little cost
to Berlinger; perhaps he will miss recording some material that he
otherwise would have wanted to capture. But the approach is unlikely
to eliminate outtakes of all material that subjects and filmmakers, if
they had their choice, would want to keep out of the hands of opposing parties. Part of the excitement and draw of documentary filmmaking is following stories that are yet unwritten, and filmmakers never
know what will unfold in front of their cameras. So even if filmmakers
are conservative with the number of hours they capture on tape, they
will still amass material that they would want to protect.
Filmmakers also will need to have upfront discussions about the
discoverability of the outtakes with subjects, particularly when the film
concerns, or is likely to lead to, litigation. Lacking other legal protections, filmmakers have an ethical duty when embarking upon a project to be open with subjects about the possible legal consequences of
279
amassing video documentation.
Filmmakers may also choose to document more formally their
reasons for accepting or rejecting subjects’ suggestions to avoid appearing subservient to their subjects. Such evidence could help
filmmakers meet the Berlinger independence test; however, courts may
280
view the documentation as self-serving.
In short, while filmmakers may be more judicious about filming or
may destroy some footage upon release of their films, there are no
simple ways for filmmakers to erect legal barriers around the footage
they choose to keep. In the wake of the Berlinger decisions, outtakes
are particularly vulnerable. While documentarians will still produce
films on topics of importance to the public, litigants should feel emboldened by the new precedent, which misunderstands these
filmmakers’ work.
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Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205; see also Itzkoff, supra note 250 (stating that Berlinger “now tells his crew members not to roll their cameras unless they’re shooting something formally intended for a film”).
278
Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205.
279
Cf. AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 6-8 (discussing the professional obligation by filmmakers to “do no harm” to their subjects).
280
See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 308 n.5 (2d Cir. 2011) (describing Berlinger’s written account of his first meeting with Donziger as “self-serving”).

ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/15/2012 7:08 PM

The Future of the Journalists’ Privilege

919

CONCLUSION
Recent decisions in the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit have revealed unfounded and potentially misleading assumptions about the nature of outtakes, documentary filmmaking,
and journalism in general. Courts have acknowledged that noninstitutional journalists and filmmakers serve the valuable role of gathering and disseminating information to the public that the journalists’
privilege is intended to protect. And yet in spite of this acknowledgement, these decisions are just the most recent in a line of cases
that have dramatically weakened the privilege for those individuals.
The media has responded to this gradual weakening of the journalists’
privilege and the corresponding increase in subpoenas by destroying
notes and other journalistic work product. If courts continue to allow
widespread discovery of journalistic work product on speculative
grounds, then the media will respond with even more draconian
measures that destroy materials of historical, journalistic, and evidentiary importance.
Courts should instead require a meaningful showing of both relevance and unavailability of other evidentiary sources and should require narrowly tailored discovery requests, if only to legitimize the
subpoena process in journalists’ minds and prevent them from taking
matters into their own hands. Courts should also abstain from describing outtakes as unique evidence that is “unimpeachably objective,” which tends to lead to the underprotection of outtakes as compared to other kinds of journalistic work product. And courts should
stop shaping doctrine that invites judges to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of journalism, a task that could restrict
the court’s flexibility as new forms of journalism emerge. A workable,
flexible framework already exists: von Bulow defines who may invoke
the privilege, and Cutler and Gonzales delineate how to adequately protect work product. Courts should enforce these limits.
There are steps the documentary film community should take to
facilitate this transformation. Aside from the study of ethics by the
Center for Social Media, there is no authoritative source of best practices or code of accepted professional conduct for documentarians.
Organizations like the Center for Social Media and the International
Documentary Association should harness their resources to produce
reports that discuss common practices and ethical considerations and
demonstrate the compatibility of these practices with editorial independence.

